The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

281. Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that he should make the following points in his

discussion with President Bush:

• The declaration was a “sham” which they should expose in the debate in the

Security Council later that week.

• “We should build up the strongest possible case over the next few weeks. Try

to find the smoking gun. Tough but may not be impossible.” A defector “ready

to give details of Saddam’s WMD programme” would be better than in country

interviews.

• “In addition we need to piece together comprehensive picture of Iraqi obstruction

and deception to demonstrate pattern of deceit.”

• “Do everything possible to maintain international coalition you skilfully built.

If there is a clear material breach, believe we can get a second resolution …”

• The UK’s military preparations were “beginning to become more public”. The

US and UK military chiefs needed “to keep in very close step”.94

282. Mr Blair told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration was

“patently false”.

283. Mr Blair was “cautiously optimistic” that the inspectors would find proof.

Sir Richard Dearlove was pursuing that.

284. Mr Blair suggested that he and President Bush should take stock in January.

285. Mr Blair and President Bush spoke on 16 December.95

286. Mr Blair commented that the Iraqi declaration “was patently false. We now needed

proof that demonstrated it.” He and President Bush discussed the need to put the

burden of truth on Saddam Hussein, how much time he should be allowed, and the need

to avoid a loss of momentum.

287. Mr Blair said that military preparations should continue. He did not think that

Saddam Hussein would co‑operate. He was “cautiously optimistic that the inspectors

might find proof that the declaration was false. We needed something or someone who

was in some way involved.” Sir Richard Dearlove was pursuing that with Mr Tenet.

288. Mr Blair was “hopeful that this strategy would work; we should take stock

in January if it was”.

94 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 16 December 2002, ‘Call to Bush at 12.30 – Checklist’.

95 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 16 December 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with President Bush,

16 December’.

52