The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
49.
Other points
made in the Assessment included:
•
The
equipment and materials used in the production of CW and BW agents
were
“subject to
international export controls imposed by some countries but all
are
dual-use.
They can therefore be imported for legitimate
purposes.”
•
“Once in
country it is difficult to prevent such equipment and materials
being
diverted to
offensive CBW programmes.”
•
“The very
large quantities of CW agent required for a significant military
attack
(of the
order of one tonne, optimally disseminated, is needed to
contaminate
2.5 sq
km …) mean that a large-scale delivery capability is
needed.”
•
“The
effectiveness of an attack depends on the lethality and persistency
of
the agent
…”
•
“BW agents
are more potent than CW agents, cheaper, easier to produce
and
usable
against a wide range of targets. A country does not need a
sophisticated
biotechnology
industry to produce BW. Their potency means that the
quantities
required
for an effective large-sale attack are relatively small … and have
the
potential
to cause more casualties. If effectively disseminated in
unprotected
urban
population centres some BW agents could cause casualties on a
scale
similar to
that of a nuclear attack. Of particular concern are agents that are
not
just
virulent, but highly infectious and capable of causing an epidemic
…
[E]ffective
delivery is difficult to guarantee.”
50.
In relation to
Iraq’s chemical weapons programme, the Assessment
stated:
“We
continue to judge … that Iraq
has an
offensive CW programme and intelligence
indicates
that it has continued to produce chemical agent … Despite
UNSCOM’s
efforts, we
believe Iraq retained some production equipment, small stocks of
agent
precursors,
and small quantities of agents and weapons, including warheads for
the
Al Hussein
650km ballistic missile. Apart from this hidden capability, Iraq
has also
retained
documentation on CW agent production and experienced key
personnel.
Despite the
constraints that have been put in place to restrict Iraq’s access
to
dual-use
equipment, the chemical industry has been built up and could be
used to
support an
offensive CW programme.”
51.
In relation to
Iraq’s biological weapons programme, the Assessment
stated:
“… Iraq has
continued with an offensive BW programme. Research,
development
and
production is assessed to continue under cover of a number of
outwardly
legitimate
institutes and covert facilities. Confirmed intelligence reveals
that
transportable
BW production facilities have been constructed. Iraq has
possibly
already
made significant quantities of BW agents and intelligence indicates
that it
has
continued to produce biological agents. We judge that Iraq is
self-sufficient in
its BW
programme and currently has available, either from pre-Gulf War
stocks or
more recent
production, anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and
possibly
plague and
ricin.”
300