14.2 |
Conclusions: Military equipment (post‑conflict)
51.
As Major
General William Rollo, General Officer Commanding
MND(SE)
(GOC MND(SE))
from July 2004 to December 2004, reported at the end of his tour,
the
consequence
of that capability gap was that operations were “planned around
ISTAR
availability,
rather than ISTAR being available for operations”.21
52.
The DOC raised
the problem in its three reports covering the post‑conflict
phase,
each of
which was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff.
53.
In February
2005, the DOC stated that ISTAR was “the most significant
capability
shortfall”
of the post‑conflict phase and it was “likely to remain an enduring
requirement,
particularly
for asymmetric warfare”.22
54.
In April 2006,
the DOC stated that “a serious gap in current ISTAR capability”
had
been “a
regular DOC observation” that had “been highlighted on all recent
operations”.23
That
prompted a more wide‑ranging debate across the MOD about how the
ISTAR
capability
gap could be addressed.
55.
As in the case
of protected mobility, the MOD was slow to respond to
the
deficiencies
identified in ISTAR and showed a lack of understanding of the
requirement
for an
enduring operation. The provision of ISTAR capabilities also
suffered from the
absence of
a clearly identified sponsor addressing the capability
gap.
56.
Lt Gen
Houghton’s review of ISTAR shortfalls in May 2006 stated that the
UK was
“only
beginning to develop a full understanding of the national ISTAR
requirements”
for transition
in both Iraq and Afghanistan.24
57.
Major General
Richard Shirreff, GOC MND(SE) from June 2006 to January
2007,
wrote in
his post‑operation report that the UK’s response was “grindingly
slow and
ponderous”
when compared with the US and Australia. They had shown more
“agility
and
forethought” in identifying solutions.25
58.
The position
improved when the Scan Eagle UAV was leased from Australia
in
April 2007
as a temporary measure until Hermes 450 came into service in July
2007.
21
Report
Rollo to PJHQ MA to CJO, 4 December 2004, ‘Post Operation Report
Operation TELIC 4/5 –
14 July
– 1 December 2004’.
22
Report DOC,
22 February 2005, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol.
2’.
23
Report DOC,
4 April 2006, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume
3’.
24
Minute CJO
to VCDS, 18 May 2006, ‘Quantifying ISTAR Shortfalls on Current
Operations’.
25
Report
Shirreff to PSO/CDS, 19 January 2007, ‘Post Operational Report –
Operation TELIC’.
237