9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
of the
Prime Minister’s statement on 8 October 2007), whilst being
prepared to
explain the
details of how this is being operationalised somewhat more openly
when
asked. We
will seek proactively to promote the fairly successful MNF efforts
to
facilitate
Iraqi reconciliation in other parts of the country. We will also
provide some
draft text
for the Secretary of State’s next operational update to Parliament
which will
go into
greater detail about the efforts of General Mohan, supported by
MND(SE), to
achieve
greater political accommodation in the South.”
510.
The advice
also asked for Mr Browne’s agreement on proposed lines to
take.
In answer
to the question “are you negotiating with JAM?”, the suggested
reply was:
“Yes – we
talk to JAM and other militia groups in our area of operations as
part
of the
strategy of political engagement and reconciliation we and our
coalition
partners
have long pursued – JAM and similar groups clearly have an interest
in
and an
influence over Basra and the rest of Iraq, and an outright refusal
to engage
in dialogue
with them would not be in Iraq’s, or Basra’s, best interests.
Moreover
the Iraqi
Government and the US are aware of, and support, these
discussions,
which form
part of the wider reconciliation initiatives being pursued through
Iraq.
And through
the newly-appointed Iraqi Commander of the Basra Operations
Centre
(BOC),
General Mohan, the Iraqis are also engaging with JAM and other
groups with
a view to
reducing the violence perpetrated against MNF and Iraqi civilians.
We and
the Iraqis
will engage with any groups who are interested in joining Iraq’s
democratic
process and
reducing violence – it is the right thing to do. We fully support
General
Mohan in
these efforts …”
511.
In response to
the question “Has the violence decreased in Basra since you
began
talking to
these groups?”, the suggested reply was:
“Talking to
these groups is nothing new and so we wouldn’t expect to see a
sudden
decrease in
violence. The security situation in Basra remains stable with only
a very
small
proportion of attacks in Iraq happening there. Indeed much of the
violence
in Basra
was directed at the MNF and this has decreased recently. Where
security
incidents
have occurred, the Iraqi security forces have demonstrated their
ability to
deal with
them.”
512.
Mr Browne
marked the submission “noted and agreed” on 13
October.
513.
Maj Gen Rose
advised the Chiefs of Staff on 16 October that a number of
splinter
groups, a
mixture of Iranian trained/funded Secret Cells and rogue JAM groups
opposed
to the
freeze on violence, had been established in southern
Iraq.245
514.
One group,
Fayha al-Sadr, focused on Basra and Dhi Qar provinces, was
thought
to be
responsible for recent attacks on the COB, but Gen Mohan and Maj
Gen Jalil had
made
improvements in security that made it likely that it would focus
its future efforts
245
Minutes, 16
October 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
277