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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
190.  The Inquiry has seen no indications that the Cabinet Office trial was taken further.
191.  A detailed brief on civilian casualties produced for Mr Blair on 18 December in
advance of his visit to Iraq made no mention of the trial or its conclusions.122
192.  An IPU official informed Mr Straw’s Private Office on 15 December that the MOD
was now ready to “step forward and explain why it is impossible for us to use our military
assets in Iraq to get an estimate [of civilian casualties]”.123 The official commented that
this was welcome. It would force the MOD to take some responsibility for managing one
of the “bear‑traps” in the UK’s existing policy:
“… although we say there are no reliable estimates of civilian casualties in Iraq,
there are estimates of a kind that are made by MND(SE) and others made by
the Pentagon. They’re unreliable but are used for military planning purposes as
evidence of trends …”
193.  Mr Ingram made that statement on 27 January 2005, in response to a question
from Mr Peter Kilfoyle.124 Mr Ingram stated that an analysis of incident reports between
1 May 2003 and 26 November 2004 indicated that 200 Iraqi citizens believed to have
been enemy combatants had died, and 80 had been injured, in incidents where military
force had been deliberately applied by UK forces. Five Iraqi citizens believed not to
have been enemy combatants had died, and a further 13 had been injured, in incidents
during the course of which military force had been deliberately applied by UK forces.
These figures did not necessarily indicate that UK forces caused the casualties, only that
they recorded them during the course of incidents in which deliberate military force was
applied.
194.  Mr Ingram also stated that 17 Iraqi citizens believed to have been enemy
combatants had died, and 22 had been injured, during the course of other incidents,
and 144 Iraqi citizens believed not to have been enemy combatants had died, and
192 had been injured, during the course of other incidents. This included the full range
of incidents in which UK forces had been involved but where no deliberate military force
had been applied, for example Improvised Explosive Device attacks by insurgent forces
on civilian targets, road traffic accidents and in one case the discovery in May 2003 of a
mass grave, thought to date back to 1991, containing 32 bodies.
195.  Mr Ingram stated that those figures should not be taken as an accurate estimate
of Iraqi casualties; they captured only those casualties which were witnessed or
discovered by UK forces. The figures did not include the major combat operations phase
of Op TELIC, prior to 1 May 2003, for which incident reports were not routinely submitted
when casualties were “discovered”.
122  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 December 2004, ‘Your Visit to Iraq’ attaching Briefing, [undated],
‘Civilian Casualties’.
123  Email IPU [junior official] to PS/Straw, 15 December 2004, ‘Civilian Casualties: MOD Line’.
124  House of Commons, Official Report, 27 January 2005, column 541W.
204
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