The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
845.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner observed that Gen Mohan had “laid it on
thick
when he
presented his plan in Baghdad, so I had to explain to Lt Gen Austin
that
Mohan was
feeding an Iraqi political demand when he talked about the
forthcoming
‘battle for Basra’.”
846.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner explained that MND(SE)’s objective was to assist
in
building up
the Iraqi Army so that they could win a psychological and political
battle
without the
need for violence. Lt Gen Austin was reported to be reassured and
said that
he did not
have the troops to open up a second front in the South while still
dealing with
the
North.
847.
Lt Gen Rollo
discussed the US SOFA plans with Ambassador Satterfield
on
9
March.414
He reported
that the US had shared drafts of the Strategic
Framework
Agreement/Status
of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi Government and, as a
result,
recognised
that compromises would be needed. Drafts would be shown to the UK
the
following
week, and the UK would be consulted on emerging US thinking on
possible
compromises,
although Ambassador Satterfield recognised that the UK had not
yet
settled its
legal position “and he observed that that would be driven by our
political
position”.
848.
On 11 March,
Lt Gen Houghton briefed the Chiefs of Staff that Gen Mohan’s
plan:
“… included
three phases, with the first (preparation) involving the building
of further
ISF
capability in terms of personnel numbers and equipment in Basra.
Phase 2
(disarmament)
would require PM to declare Basra as a ‘weapons free zone’
with
incentives
being provided for a voluntary handover of weapons: this phase
would
have a
specific end date (possibly 1 June 08) after which Phase 3
(confrontation)
would be
entered. Phase 3 would consist of search and strike missions aimed
at
confronting
those who were not reconciled.”415
849.
ACM Stirrup
visited Iraq from 14 to 17 March, travelling to both Baghdad
and
Basra.416
ACM Stirrup
underlined to Maj Gen Binns, that “both a fully
functioning
airport and
a capable and credible 14 (IA) Div [14th Division of the Iraqi
Army] were
pre‑requisites
for a UK withdrawal”. They agreed that both were achievable
by
the end of 2008.
850.
ACM Stirrup
and Mr Jones agreed that “the continuing military presence in
the
COB would
hinder local economic development and perpetuate attacks”. In
discussion
with senior
members of the US military, ACM Stirrup “noted with disquiet the
current US
plan
earmarks the UK remaining in Tactical Overwatch in perpetuity”.
This expectation
would need
to be “realigned and managed as potentially divergent UK plans
unfold”.
414
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 10 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (291) 10 Mar
08’.
415
Minutes, 11
March 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
416
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 17 March 2008, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 14-17 Mar 07
[sic]’.
338