3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
“… we were
in the same place as the US. September should be the month to
sort
out the
strategy. We should be clear within two weeks how the UN route
should
work. We
were determined to deal with the WMD issue. September 11 had taught
us
the
importance of dealing pre‑emptively with these types of
threats.”
185.
Copies of
Mr Rycroft’s minute were sent to the Private Offices of
Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon
and the Cabinet Secretary, and to Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief
of the
Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS)), Sir Francis Richards (Director of
the Government
Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ)), Sir Christopher Meyer (British
Ambassador to
the US),
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Mr Scarlett, and Mr Tom
McKane (Deputy Head
of OD
Sec).
186.
A fuller
record was circulated within No.10 and to Mr Straw on a
strictly personal
basis.65
It included
references to the advice which had already been offered to the
US
and to the
planned meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush in early
September.
It also
stated that Mr Blair’s view was that conflict was
“inevitable”: he did not think
Saddam
would comply with the UN demands, “but the choice was
Saddam’s”.
187.
Dr Rice
told Sir David Manning that President Bush had worked
carefully
through the
ideas in Mr Blair’s Note of 28 July and concluded the best
way
forward was
the “UN route”.
188.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that the UK would share its ideas on
a
resolution
“shortly”.
189.
Dr Rice
and Sir David also discussed the need to launch an effective
public
relations
campaign to coincide with the decision to go back to the
UN.
190.
Dr Rice
and Sir David Manning spoke later that day to follow up the
discussion
between
Mr Blair and President Bush.66
191.
Dr Rice
told Sir David Manning that President Bush had given “a great
deal of
thought to
Iraq during his summer vacation at the Crawford ranch”. He had
worked
carefully
through the ideas in Mr Blair’s Note of 28 July and had
concluded the best way
forward was
the UN route.
192.
Sir David
and Dr Rice discussed how an approach to secure UN action
might
best be
pursued and agreed that it would be useful for Mr Alastair
Campbell, Mr Blair’s
Director of
Communications and Strategy) and Ms Karen
Armstrong,67
to
talk:
“We needed
to mount a really effective public relations campaign to coincide
with the
65
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
29 August’.
66
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
67
The context
suggests that the record should have referred to Karen Hughes,
Counsellor to
President Bush
from 2001 to 2002.
127