The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
process
understand the history, but the others who have been dragged in are
less
understanding.
The existing UK military posture and lack of situational
awareness
due to
having no ground troops in the city gave the perception that JAM
had been
allowed
free rein. That said … Lt Gen Austin told me that he was impressed
by all
he saw
of MND(SE) when he visited …
“The
UK-Iraqi relationship is damaged. Various … reports have
highlighted
Maliki’s …
outburst against the UK. Maliki blames us for the situation in
Basra and
perceived
failure to support his forces. The fault lay largely with Iraqi
lack of planning
and a poor
command performance, but what is clear is that post this event,
UK-Iraqi
relations
will need some repair if we are to continue to make a contribution
whilst
in Basra.
We do not know how this will turn out in the next days and weeks,
but we
should
focus on shaping the future as best as possible.”
912.
In preparation
for a meeting of NSID(OD) on 1 April, to consider the
UK’s
“continuing
role in Basra in 2008/2009, and the timelines and considerations
for
taking
decisions on force level options”, attendees were supplied with
three papers.450
They were
a short-term strategy paper, a draft of a planned statement to
Parliament
by Mr Browne
and a letter from Mr Alexander on economic
progress.
913.
A Cabinet
Office ‘Chair’s Brief’ for Mr Brown identified five objectives
for the
meeting:
•
agreeing
the terms of Mr Browne’s statement to Parliament that
afternoon;
•
beginning
discussions – to be continued once the situation in Basra
was
clearer –
on future force levels in Iraq;
•
considering
“how best to sensitise US interlocutors to the possibility of a
more
rapid UK
military withdrawal than they would wish for, while recognising the
need
to maintain
our long term close relationship with the US”;
•
securing
agreement to officials engaging more actively in the US
negotiations
with the
Iraqis on legal cover for MNF in Iraq once resolution 1790 expired;
and
•
reviewing
progress on political and economic initiatives in Iraq, ahead of a
more
substantive
discussion in NSID(OD) in May.451
914.
In a separate
paper sent to all attendees, Cabinet Office officials
recommended
that
Ministers agree that:
•
Mr Browne
should announce to Parliament that UK troop levels would remain
at
current
levels (4,100 in southern Iraq) until the situation became
clearer;
•
no decision
on the longer-term posture should be taken in the immediate
future,
but
consideration should be given to “how best to sensitise US
interlocutors
450
Paper
Cabinet Office, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq’.
451
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior officials] to Prime Minister, 31 March 2008,
‘NSID(OD) Meeting on Iraq
and
Afghanistan: 1 April 13:30 – Chair’s Brief’.
350