The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
all of it
presented as evidence from the Government’s forthcoming dossier. By
doing
so, we can
build momentum.”155
343.
Mr Williams
identified the need to “encourage support from
sympathetic
newspapers
and carry the argument to those likely to criticise our policy”.
Journalists
who were
“too easily inclined to discount the threat Saddam poses” should be
“forced by
the weight
of facts” to justify their position. The exercise:
“… should
be part of a big effort to convey more clearly than we have before
a sense
that we are
proposing a peaceful means of dealing with the problem through the
UN,
while
Saddam is deliberately making a peaceful solution impossible. We
have to
stop his
propagandists portraying him as the victim, rather than the
villain. If action
becomes
necessary, it must be clear to all but a minority in [the] media
and public
opinion
that we have exhausted all other means, and that Saddam is at
fault.”
344.
Mr Williams
also suggested the need to co-ordinate information and
activity
between
London and Washington and consideration of using the Communications
and
Information
Centre (CIC).
345.
Mr Williams
provided a more detailed media strategy, “agreed with Middle
East
Command [in
the FCO] and No.10 Press Office”, which had been prepared by one of
his
staff and
was “designed to co-ordinate and pace our efforts for maximum
impact”.
346.
The objectives
of the strategy were identified as:
•
convincing
people of “the real threat to their safety and security” from
Iraq’s
WMD
programmes;
•
demonstrating
that Iraq was “in breach of its international obligations
to
co‑operate
with the UN”;
•
preparing
“public opinion in Britain and abroad … for possible military
action”;
and
•
rebutting
allegations about the UK’s policy, “e.g. that it is to toe the line
or keep
the Muslim
world weak”.
347.
The strategy
set out suggested key messages and a list of potential
pitfalls,
including
balancing the need to prepare against the risk of “raising
expectations that
military
action is a foregone conclusion before a final decision has been
taken”.
348.
A list of
potential media activities included:
•
working
with “No.10 and others on a dossier of releasable evidence
about
Saddam’s
weapons programmes”; and
•
following
“a decision in principle to take military action” establishing an
FCO-led,
CIC-style
unit to “generate material” for use by the FCO and
No.10.
155
Minute
Williams [John] to PS/Secretary of State [FCO], 11 March 2002,
‘Iraq Media Strategy’.
78