The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the basis
of a December to February window for military action. Because of
continuing
uncertainties,
including over Turkey, the MOD did not feel able to advise
Ministers
whether the
US had a “winning concept”.
577.
Mr Wright
also wrote that the MOD “sense a mounting desire on the part of
US
military
planners to learn more about the possible levels of UK force
commitments”.
578.
A revised
version of the SPG paper ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’
was
produced on
4 September.234
The paper
contained significant new analysis about the US
intentions
and their implications for UK planning.
579.
The SPG
assessed that the US had “sufficient combat power to destabilise,
and
overthrow
the current Iraqi regime” by itself, but it required a “minimum
coalition” to
provide
basing and transit, including use of UK bases in Cyprus and Diego
Garcia. The
paper also
set out the current CENTCOM concept and plan, including an
assessment
that
“shaping operations” (described as including a “series of
activities designated as
spikes by
the US”, which were “intended to progressively increase the level
and tempo
of military
activity”) had “already begun” and the UK was “implicated in their
conduct”.
580.
A number of
key issues would “need to be resolved” to evaluate the design of
the
campaign.
Those included:
•
avoiding a
tactical victory at the cost of strategic failure;
•
determining
the “strategic effect” the UK was seeking from participation in
the
campaign;
•
demonstrating
“US/UK solidarity (delivering the Special
Relationship)”;
•
adding
“value through sharing the planning burden, and acting as a
moderating
influence”
on the US; and
•
demonstrating
that the UK was “an active, determined and capable nation
by
making an
operationally significant contribution, in a discrete role that
satisfies
a clear
military objective”.
581.
The potential
UK strategic objectives identified by the SPG were to:
•
Stand
alongside the US as a junior partner, sharing both the strategic
and
operational
risks and burdens, to:
{{preserve
the Atlantic Alliance; and
{{encourage the
US to continue to exercise its power via established
international
bodies and norms.
234
Paper
[SPG], 4 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
262