9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
62.
Mr Brown
discussed Iraq with President Bush by video link on 9
July.32
Mr Brown
commented
that the Iraqi Government was making slow progress. Faster action
was
needed on
the Hydrocarbons Law and on “democratisation”. Mr Brown
indicated his
intention
to talk to Prime Minister Maliki regularly, and that he hoped to
persuade him to
work with
the Executive Group.
63.
Mr McDonald
told the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) on 9 July that contacts with
the
US
indicated that they recognised there would be a need to move from a
combat to a
support
role following the Congressional assessment (see Section
9.5).33
Mr Brown’s
instincts
were reported to be “to keep close to the US”.
64.
The ISG also
discussed a paper on leaving Basra Palace. The question of
when
departure
should happen was not resolved, but the Group concluded that
“ideally, there
should not
be a large gap between leaving Basra Palace and moving to
PIC”.
65.
Mr McDonald
told the ISG that NSID(OD) was provisionally scheduled to meet
for
the first
time on 19 July.
66.
Lt Gen
Houghton reported to the Chiefs of Staff on 10 July that the number
of
incidents
in MND(SE) had reduced from 123 to 85, of which 58 were attacks
against
MNF-I and
83 were in Basra.34
Although
IDF was the most prevalent form of attack, the
threat from
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on mobile patrols and strike
operations
was more
dangerous and caused the most casualties.
67.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that Maj Gen Shaw:
“… now
considered that the issue of force posture in Basra should be
de-coupled
from the
timeline for transition to PIC. Relocating from Basra Palace and
the
Provincial
Joint Command Centre would degrade the granularity of our
situational
awareness,
reducing our ability to conduct strike operations or intervene to
provide
security.
However, such contingencies were to be conducted only
in
extremis.
A
successful
withdrawal from Basra was predicated on the engagement of
Iraqis,
including
the Palace Protection Force, who would assume responsibility for
security.
A clear
plan for the handover of facilities and security responsibility was
required.
CJO [Lt Gen
Houghton] was to outline the plan for the transition, including
the
arrangements
for gifting of assets, the key Iraqi organisations and
individuals
who would
be involved, the impact of Umm Qasr and the supporting
Information
Operations
plan.”
68.
In an
interview on the Today
Programme on 11 July,
Mr Brown was asked whether
he planned
to change the UK’s strategy in Iraq. Mr Brown explained that
the strategy the
UK was
pursuing focused on building security, trying to achieve political
reconciliation
and build
democracy and providing the people of Iraq with a “stake in the
future” by
32
Letter
Henderson to Hayes, 9 July 2007, ‘Iraq/Afghanistan: Prime
Minister’s VTC with President Bush’.
33
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 11 July 2007, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 9 July’.
34
Minutes, 10
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
195