6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
147.
The ‘Iraq:
Options Paper’ set out three options for bringing about regime
change,
including a
full-scale ground campaign.91
It
identified two options for a successor regime:
a Sunni
military strongman or “a representative, broadly democratic
government”.
The paper
stated: “we need to wait and see which options or combination of
options
may be
favoured by the US government”. It warned that achieving a
representative,
broadly
democratic successor government would require “the US and others to
commit
to
nation-building for many years. This would entail a substantial
international security
force and
help with reconstruction.”
148.
Throughout
2002 and early 2003, the UK remained sceptical about
the
capacity
and credibility of the Iraqi opposition in exile and in Iraq, both
as a
force for
change and as the potential core of a credible post-Saddam
Hussein
administration.
149.
The ‘Iraq:
Options Paper’ stated that:
“Unaided,
the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime.
The external
opposition
is weak,
divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant
group
is the
Iraqi National Congress …
“The
internal
opposition is small
and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds.”
150.
On 5 March
2002, Mr Ben Bradshaw, FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary
of
State, held
a meeting with the “Group of Four” (G4) Iraqi opposition parties:
the Iraqi
National
Accord (INA), represented by future Iraqi Prime Minister Dr Ayad
Allawi, the
KDP, the
PUK and SCIRI.92
The
delegation told Mr Bradshaw that “things were moving
in
Iraq”, the
people supported regime change and the UK could play a role. Mr
Bradshaw
stated that
the UK wanted to pursue the UN route first.
151.
On 12 March,
Mr Bradshaw met a delegation from the INC headed by Dr
Ahmed
Chalabi, at
which Dr Chalabi suggested that the INC would like to hold a
conference in
London to
garner international support for planning for a post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq.93
152.
The Inquiry
has seen no evidence of any response from Mr Bradshaw.
91
Paper
Cabinet Office, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Options Paper’.
92
Minute MED
to APS/Mr Bradshaw, 5 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Mr Bradshaw’s meeting with
Iraqi Opposition’.
93
Minute MED
to APS/Mr Bradshaw, 25 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Mr Bradshaw’s Meeting
with Iraqi National
Congress,
12 March’.
139