Executive Summary

86. The Cabinet Office paper also identified the need to address the issue of whether

the benefits of military action would outweigh the risks.

87. The potential mismatch between the timetable and work programme for UNMOVIC

stipulated in resolution 1284 (1999) and the US plans for military action was recognised

by officials during the preparation of the Cabinet Office paper.26

88. The issue was not addressed in the final paper submitted to Ministers on 19 July.27

89. Sir Richard Dearlove reported that he had been told that the US had already taken

a decision on action – “the question was only how and when”; and that he had been told

it intended to set the threshold on weapons inspections so high that Iraq would not be

able to hold up US policy.28

90. Mr Blair’s meeting with Ministerial colleagues and senior officials on 23 July was

not seen by those involved as having taken decisions.29

91. Further advice and background material were commissioned, including on the

possibility of a UN ultimatum to Iraq and the legal basis for action. The record stated:

“We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military

action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm

decisions. CDS [the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce] should

tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.”

92. Mr Blair was advised that there would be “formidable obstacles” to securing a new

UN resolution incorporating an ultimatum without convincing evidence of a greatly

increased threat from Iraq.30 A great deal more work would be needed to clarify what the

UK was seeking and how its objective might best be achieved.

93. Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade President Bush to

use the UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership between the UK and

the US and setting out a framework for action.31

94. The Note began:

“I will be with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the difficulties.

The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo.

This is not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.

26 Paper [Draft] Cabinet Office, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ attached to Minute McKane to Bowen,

16 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

27 Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.

28 Report, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq [C’s account of discussions with Dr Rice]’.

29 Minute Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July’.

30 Letter McDonald to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Ultimatum’ attaching Paper ‘Elements which might

be incorporated in an SCR embodying an ultimatum to Iraq’.

31 Note Blair [to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.

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