3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

646. The record of the discussion stated that Mr Blair referred to US disappointment

with Dr Blix’s report of 14 February and that it was “now difficult to dissuade the

Americans from going down the military route”. Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he was

concerned about the risk of the UN being marginalised and of a split in the international

community; and that he wanted to offer the US “an alternative strategy”.

647. Mr Blair outlined the need to devise an ultimatum including a deadline and

imposing a duty on Saddam Hussein to co-operate actively; and that failure to do

so would be a breach of resolution 1441. That would accompany a “simple” resolution

that would be Saddam Hussein’s “final final” warning. There were “some indications”

that, with a second resolution, “the Arabs might be able to lever Saddam out of power”.

Mr Blair added that co-operation would need to be defined and Saddam Hussein would

need to comply in full.

648. Dr Blix was attracted by timelines but commented that “full co-operation was

a nebulous concept”. Later he stated that demands for co-operation had to be related

to what was “realistically do-able”.

649. Dr Blix told Mr Blair that the UN should have a catalogue of the action required on

disarmament by the end of the following week. He should be able to share the “clusters”

of unanswered questions with the UNMOVIC College of Commissioners by 24 February.

The intelligence he had received was “not all that compelling”. While he still tended to

think that Iraq was concealing some WMD, he needed evidence to put to the Security

Council. He was receiving “a flow of half promises” on Iraqi co-operation and needed

more time.

650. Mr Blair said that the Iraqis could have signalled a change of heart in the

December declaration. The Americans did not think that Saddam Hussein was going

to co-operate: “Nor did he. But we needed to keep the international community together.”

651. Dr Blix suggested that “key disarmament tasks” could be selected from resolution

1284 as it would be easier to judge compliance on those. They discussed the difficulties

with interviewing Iraqis, which Dr Blix said he would be working on the following week.

It was important to keep the pressure on Iraq.

652. Dr Blix confirmed that he had suggested a deadline of 15 April to the US, which

they thought was too late. He thought it was too early. The threat of war was making

it difficult to recruit and retain inspectors.

653. Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he would pursue the ultimatum route and try to get

Dr Blix as much time as possible.

654. Dr Blix commented that “perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all”.

Mr Blair responded that “even German and French intelligence were sure that there was

WMD in Iraq”. Dr Blix said they seemed “unsure” about mobile BW production facilities:

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