12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
The Warren
site in Basra City housed the Provincial Joint Co‑ordination Centre
(PJCC)
command and
control centre.1179
The PJCC
was a provincial security committee to discuss
“security
issues in the broadest sense”.1180
The Warren
also housed a number of IPS
specialist
units including the TIPS line (see Box earlier in this Section,
‘TIPS hotline’), the
Major
Crimes Unit (MCU), and the National Information and Investigation
Agency (NIIA).
The PJCC
building was located around 5km from Basra Palace and 15km from
Basra
Airport
(see Map 6, Annex 4).
1268.
The following
week, on 7 December, Maj Gen Shirreff
reported:
“I have
come to the conclusion that the best we can achieve through
SINBAD
are those
surface level improvements required to get police stations to TRA
level
2, the
critical level for PIC. Culling militia infiltrators from the
police is a non‑starter
without a
national anti‑militia plan including DDR [Disarmament,
Demobilisation
1269.
CC Kernaghan
visited Iraq from 4 to 6 October 2006.1182
His stay was
hampered
by problems
with transport and he was unable to go to Baghdad. The main focus
of his
visit
report was the lack of support coming from the MOI and he cited
cases of corrupt
officers
being sacked in MND(SE) only to be reinstated “often in a higher
rank” by
the MOI.
1270.
CC Kernaghan
recommended:
“We should
now be planning for a new era in which there is a reduced overt
British
military
presence in southern Iraq. If we move to a security infrastructure
delivered
primarily
by the Iraqis then we should remodel our support to reflect that
new
reality. In
such an era I would suggest station visits and routine training
delivery
are
irrelevant. We need to ask the MOI what support they would value
over the
medium term
and then decide how best we could provide that support,
assuming
political
support. I believe our focus should move from the tactical to the
strategic …
Crucially
it is hard to justify investing in tactical achievements and gains
when it
appears the
wider strategic context is undermining our overall goals. The Iraqi
MOI
must set
out their visions and we should seek to support it where we can and
feel it
is
appropriate.”
1179
Statement
Colbourne, 29 June 2010, page 6.
1180
Minute
Naworynsky to Quarry, 11 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Security Structures after
30 June’.
1181
Minute
Shirreff to CJO, 7 December 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
07 December
2006’.
1182
Report, 6
October 2006, ‘5th
Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable Kernaghan 4‑6 October 2006’.
349