The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
44.
Ms Carolyn
Miller, DFID Director Middle East and North Africa and the
DFID
member of
the UK delegation, informed Ms Short that the annotated agenda had
been
“put
together rapidly”, but DFID had been able to feed in a number of
points, including:
“… the
importance of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian
aid;
the need to
factor in the risks of operating if CBW are used; the requirement
for
affordable
financing arrangements for relief and reconstruction especially if
OFF
collapses;
and the importance of moving from dependence on handouts to
an
Iraq‑led
economic recovery”.21
45.
Separate
MOD briefing for the Washington talks listed questions to which
“we
must first
have answers” before the UK assumed post-conflict
responsibilities:
•
the future
of the Iraq military, police and local and regional
government;
•
the legal
basis for Coalition involvement in civil security;
•
military
sectors;
•
the
military’s role in managing oil production; and
•
when
humanitarian agencies would take the lead in providing
assistance.
46.
The briefing
prepared for Mr Lee, the senior MOD member of the UK
delegation
for Washington,
included “baseline assumptions” for UK force contributions in
four
post-conflict
phases. The briefing stated that, in the absence of a US decision
on
timelines,
the assumptions were only illustrative.22
47.
The suggested
UK land force contribution under each phase was:
•
US military
administration (0-6 months): war-fighting forces (large
scale);23
•
Coalition
administration (6-12 months): large scale reducing to medium
scale;24
•
civil
administration (12-24 months): medium scale reducing to small
scale;25
and
•
full Iraqi
governance (24 months plus): small scale reducing to advisory
teams.
48.
The briefing
stated that the UK military would: “Take regional responsibility
for AM
[aftermath]
operations in our current War-fighting JOA [Joint Operational
Area], at least
for the
first six months.” Military tasks would include setting the
conditions for successful
DDR/SSR
(Security Sector Reform) programmes. The military would also
support a civil/
NGO lead
in:
•
humanitarian
operations, including distribution of food and water, provision
of
shelter and
control of internally displaced persons;
21
Minute
Miller to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 18 January 2003,
‘UK/US/Australia talks in Washington:
22
January’.
22
Minute
Sec(O)4 to DG Op Pol, 21 January 2003, ‘Visit to Washington – Iraq
Aftermath’.
23
Defined in
the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) as
deployments of division size or equivalent.
24
Defined in
the 1998 SDR as “deployments of brigade size or equivalent” for
war-fighting or other
operations.
25
Defined in
the 1998 SDR as “a deployment of battalion size or
equivalent”.
318