The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• SIS added a comment that the reporting of additional risks being taken to

increase production was consistent with UNSCOM’s observation on Iraqi

working practices and their disregard for safety.

• SIS also added a comment that the reporting of an order to stop production and

decontaminate equipment in August 2002 was “unsurprising” as it paralleled the

then assumed arrival of UNMOVIC. It added that the current state of the facility

“and the material produced prior to August 2002” was “unknown”.

• SIS had been unable to identify the “anthrax specialist” mentioned in the

original report.

528.  The summary of the intelligence produced for dissemination at “Secret” level,

including to selected foreign partners, presented the information that the Iraqi regime

had “demanded accelerated production of BCW substances” in 2002. In August 2002 an

order had been sent to all factories involved in producing BCW instructing them to stop

producing prohibited substances.

529.  The reissued report was sent to officials in the FCO, the MOD – including the

DIS, the Cabinet Office and GCHQ. It was not sent to the original, high-level recipients

of the September reports.

530.  After the conflict the sub-source told SIS that he had not provided the

information in the reports.

531.  SIS formally withdrew the reporting on 29 July 2003.

532.  SIS finally met the sub-source in June 2003.197 He had been involved in Iraq’s

CW programme before 1991 and had also been involved in Iraq’s destruction activities.

The sub-source denied that he had provided any of the material attributed to him. SIS

concluded that its source was a fabricator who had lied from the outset.

533.  On 3 July, a SIS Requirements officer wrote that it was “now necessary” to

withdraw the reports issued on 11 and 23 September and 3 April.198

534.  The Requirements officer added:

“Without denying that these reports are no longer valid, we need to ensure their

withdrawal does not provide wide-spread scepticism about our CW reporting,

particularly in the absence of a convincing CW find.”

535.  The relevant SIS team leader had “prepared the ground with Mr Scarlett and

others for the likelihood that, now we have the opportunity to validate our CX, some may

prove false. They were sanguine about this, at least in the abstract. But DIS in particular

remain sceptical of our CW reporting and Assessments Staff continue to claim (wrongly)

that they drew on the [11 September report] for the dossier.”

197  SIS record, 25 June 2003.

198  Minute, 3 July 2003, ‘Withdrawal of CX’.

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