14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
288.
On 1 October,
the DIS produced two reports that were circulated within the
MOD
and to the
intelligence agencies.146
One looked
at the Command Wire IED (CWIED)
threat and
the other at the Radio‑Controlled IED (RCIED) threat.
289.
The CWIED
report assessed that CWIED attacks were relatively uncommon
but
were
growing in number and sophistication; that was assessed as a
“concerted attempt”
to counter
ECM. The DIS advised that improvements to ECM were “likely to lead
to
increased
use of CWIED, RCIED and other forms of non‑Radio‑Controlled
command
initiated
IEDs”.
290.
The RCIED
report stated that RCIED attacks represented around 75 percent
of all
IEDs and
that IEDs in turn accounted for 75 percent of casualties.
The DIS assessed
that in the
next 12 months:
“IED
technology in use with other Middle Eastern groups especially
Lebanese
Hizballah,
can be expected to appear in Iraq. This would include multiple
systems,
such as RC
(Radio‑Controlled) switched PIRs [Passive Infra Red].”
291.
Also on 1
October, Gen Walker received an update from AM Torpy on the
provision
of ECM to
UK forces:
•
The number,
complexity and sophistication of RCIEDs used against
coalition
forces was
increasing.
•
The L*
programme was experiencing some manufacturing delays.
•
There was
insufficient ECM equipment in MND(SE) to provide protection for
all
troops and
therefore prioritisation had been necessary.
•
ECM did not
offer 100 percent protection and was used in conjunction with
TTPs
and other
force protection measures.147
292.
AM Torpy
informed Gen Walker that the value of the L* programme had
risen to
over £100m
since its approval in late 2003.
293.
In his
post‑tour report, Maj Gen Rollo commented:
“The
current ECM suite is adapting to meet the threat, providing UK
soldiers the best
protection
amongst the coalition forces, but procurement and production
struggle to
meet the
demands in theatre. We are well below the scales needed for
appropriate
ECM
protection and whilst the problem lies with industry there must be
constant
pressure to
improve the situation.”148
146
Report DIS,
1 October 2004, ‘The Radio‑Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
Threat to UK Forces
in Iraq’;
Report DIS, 1 October 2004, ‘The Command Wire Improvised Explosive
Device Threat to UK
Forces in
Iraq’.
147
Minute PJHQ
to PSO/CDS, 1 October 2004, Op TELIC/ORACLE: Provision of
Electronic Counter
Measures
(ECM)’.
148
Report
Rollo to PJHQ MA to CJO, 4 December 2004, ‘Post Operation Report
Operation Telic 4/5
14th July
– 1st December 2004’.
51