3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
351.
Mr Straw
told the House of Commons on 13 February that the
conclusion
that Iraq
was in further material breach of resolution 1441 was
“inescapable”.
352.
A peaceful
outcome to the crisis depended on maintaining
unrelenting
pressure on
Saddam Hussein to disarm, and a decision by him to
co-operate.
353.
Because the
House of Commons would be in recess the following week,
Mr Straw
made a
statement on 13 February.99
354.
Mr Straw
said that the reports presented by Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei on
27 January
had “painted a disturbing picture”. “Most damning of all” was
Dr Blix’s
observation
that Iraq appeared “not to have come to a genuine acceptance” of
the
demand for
disarmament. Mr Straw added that the central premise of Iraq’s
“so-called
disclosure”,
that Iraq possessed no WMD “was, and remains, a lie”. “Nor was
there any
admission
of Iraq’s extensive efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction
since …
December
1998” when the inspectors were “effectively excluded from
Iraq”.
355.
Mr Straw
stated that the briefings on 27 January and Secretary
Powell’s
presentation
to the Security Council on 5 February left “no doubt that Iraq
had
failed to
meet” the “two clear tests for further material breach” set out in
resolution
1441.
Mr Straw added : “The conclusion is therefore inescapable:
Iraq is in further
material breach
…”
356.
The points
made by Mr Straw included:
•
He still
hoped and prayed “for a peaceful outcome to the crisis”, but that
would
only be
possible if “unrelenting pressure” was maintained on Saddam
Hussein,
“including
the threat of force, rather than casting around for excuses to
delay”.
•
If the
international community “lost its nerve”, that would “significantly
undermine
the UN’s
authority and make the world a much more dangerous place,
as
dictators
got the message that international law consisted of mere words
and
nothing
else”.
•
French and
German calls to “bolster the inspections regime” would
not
“deliver the
assurance the world needs” and were “unrealistic and
impractical”.
They
shifted “the burden of proof from Iraq … to the inspectors”; and
sent
“Saddam the
signal that defiance pays”.
•
Armed
intervention was not inevitable and a peaceful resolution of the
crisis
remained in
Saddam’s hands. But the inspectors would “not be able to fulfil
their
mandate to
verify Iraqi disarmament” without Iraq’s compliance. In that
event,
resolution
1441 warned Iraq to expect “serious consequences”: “By now,
even
Saddam
Hussein must be under no illusions: that can only mean
disarmament
by
force.”
99
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13
February 2003, columns 1056-1071.
241