The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
134.
By 6 December,
questions were being asked within SIS about whether there
was
any further
reporting.51
It was
suggested that that meant “a health warning” on
material
from SIS’s
source.
135.
Following
further contacts, doubts were expressed on 9 December within
SIS
about the
reliability of the source and whether he had “made up all or part
of the account
of his
dealings” with the sub-source.52
136.
Reporting on
16 December suggested that further material did
exist.53
137.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary recorded that Mr Straw asked
for
an “update
on the likelihood” of [codename] “producing silver bullet
intelligence to
guide the
UNMOVIC inspection teams” in his meeting with Sir Richard Dearlove
on
138.
Sir Richard
was reported to have stated that “the outcome of [codename]
was
still in
the balance”. SIS was talking to his contacts and he [the
sub-source] “definitely
existed”;
but he “may not have written up the intelligence in the manner
which was being
claimed for
him”.
139.
Sir Richard
also told Mr Straw that US policy and planning – the
“generation
of a road
map” – were proceeding “on the assumption that a silver bullet
would not
be forthcoming”.
140.
Mr Straw
was reported to have been “concerned by the timetabling and what
would
happen
without evidence of a clear material breach”; and that “in a recent
meeting the
Prime
Minister had made the point that unless there was a clear material
breach, he
would face
political difficulties in joining the US in military action”.
Mr Straw had said
it was
“important that there was a sufficiently strong case against Saddam
to move a
resolution
at the UNSC”. The “objective was to ‘scare the pants off the
Iraqis’”.
141.
Following the
meeting, a copy of the report of Sir Richard’s visit to Washington
was
sent to
Mr Straw’s office on 19 December.55
142.
By 24 December
there were still “unresolved questions” about the SIS
case.56
143.
The JIC’s
initial Assessment on 18 December 2002 of Iraq’s
declaration stated:
•
Intelligence
from late November indicted that Iraq’s aim was to
overload
UNMOVIC
with information.
51
SIS record,
6 December 2002.
52
SIS record,
9 December 2002.
53
SIS record,
16 December 2002.
54
Minute
PS/C, 19 December 2002, ‘SOFSFCA – Iraq Discussion with C on 19
December’.
55
Letter PS/C
to McDonald, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussions in Washington
16-17 December’.
56
SIS record,
24 December 2002.
314