Executive
Summary
787.
ACM Stirrup’s
conclusion that there was no need to review UK drawdown
plans
was
premature in the light of both the level of uncertainty generated
by the Charge of
the Knights
and continued questions about the ability of the ISF to take the
security
lead in
Basra.
788.
From mid‑2005
onwards, various senior individuals – officials, military officers
and
Ministers –
began to consider whether the UK was heading towards “strategic
failure”
in Iraq.
789.
The term
“strategic failure” was variously used to mean:
•
the
development of a widespread sectarian conflict or civil war in
Iraq;
•
“victory”
for terrorist groups;
•
collapse of
the democratic process;
•
failure to
achieve the UK’s objectives;
•
failure to
achieve a stable and secure environment in Basra;
•
the
collapse of the UK/Iraq relationship;
•
the
division of Iraq and the end of its existence as a nation
state;
•
damage to
the UK’s military and political reputation; and
•
damage to
the relationship between the US and UK.
790.
None of the
contemporary accounts that the Inquiry has considered reached
the
conclusion
that strategic failure was inevitable, although most recognised
that without
some form
of corrective action it was a serious risk.
791.
Although the
UK revisited its Iraq strategy with considerable frequency,
no
substantial
change in approach was ever implemented: UK troop numbers
continued
to reduce;
the size of the civilian deployment varied very little; the
Iraqiisation of security
and
handover of responsibility to the Iraqi Government remained key
objectives.
792.
The Iraq of
2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described
in
January
2003: it fell far short of strategic success. Although the borders
of Iraq were the
same as
they had been in 2003, deep sectarian divisions threatened both
stability and
unity.
Those divisions were not created by the coalition, but they were
exacerbated by
its
decisions on de‑Ba’athification and on demobilisation of the Iraqi
Army and were not
addressed
by an effective programme of reconciliation.
793.
In January
2009, the JIC judged “internal political failures that could lead
to
renewed
violence within and between Iraq’s Sunni, Shia and Kurdish
communities”278
to be
the greatest strategic threat to Iraq’s stability.
278
JIC
Assessment, 28 January 2009, ‘Iraq: Threats to Stability and UK
Mission Change in 2009’.
109