15.2 |
Conclusions: Civilian personnel
27.
The FCO, under
the direction of Sir Michael Jay, the Permanent Under
Secretary,
co-ordinated
the Whitehall response.
28.
The FCO’s
approach was ad hoc, reflecting the absence of:
•
adequate
pre-invasion planning;
•
a Whitehall
mechanism for co-ordinating the urgent recruitment of volunteers;
and
•
clear US
job descriptions for the vacant ORHA/CPA posts in
Iraq.
29.
On 22 April,
with no clear job descriptions to draw on, Sir Michael Jay called
on
departments
to “take a broad view in looking for volunteers”.3
He stated
that “enthusiasm
and
personal qualities are likely to be just as important as specific
expertise”.
30.
Officials
informed the 22 May meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on
Iraq
Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR) that 61 UK officials had been seconded to ORHA, five of
them
in Basra.
Officials were able to provide Ministers with only very basic
information on
the
functions of 35 of the 61, explaining: “Some secondees have yet to
be allocated
31.
On 25 July,
Sir Michael Jay described the training and deployment since April
of
“over 100
civilian staff from sixteen different branches of government” as an
exercise
having “no
modern precedent”.5
32.
While
recognising that some of the difficulties faced by the UK
reflected
shortcomings
in US plans, the Inquiry considers the deployment to have
been
unsatisfactory.
Volunteers appear to have been recruited in a hasty and
haphazard
manner,
without procedures to assess their suitability for a very
challenging task.
Civilians
arrived in Iraq more slowly than required, with inadequate
preparation and
to fill positions
that were ill defined.
33.
As early as
June 2003, concerns emerged that some civilians deployed to
Iraq
were not
capable of meeting the physical requirements of working in such a
difficult
environment.
34.
Ms Emma Sky,
CPA Governorate Co-ordinator for Kirkuk from June 2003
to
February
2004, told the Inquiry that she was not given a briefing by the FCO
before
travelling
to Iraq. Instead she had received a phone call telling her “You’ve
spent a
lot of time
in the Middle East. You will be fine.”6
35.
Between June
and August 2003, Ministers and officials pressed for a
more
ambitious
response to the demand for civilian personnel. The UK sought to
deploy
3
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 22 April 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Support for the Office for
Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA)’.
4 Annotated
Agenda, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
5
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 25 July 2003, ‘Iraq: UK support for
reconstruction’.
6
Private
hearing, 14 January 2011, page 2.
415