The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“the 10
months since Saddam first threw out the inspectors last February”
when “two
successive
resolutions have given us the authority to carry out this
action”.
707.
Mr Cook
described the threat as, “not an arsenal of completed weapons”
but
the
“capacity to produce weapons of terror … within months if we turn
our backs”.
The
Government had two objectives. The first was “to defeat Saddam’s
ambitions to
continue to
develop such weapons, with which he could terrorise his
neighbours”. The
second was
“to reduce the threat to Saddam’s neighbours by diminishing his
military
war machine”.
708.
In the debate
that followed the statement, the majority of speakers
supported
military
action.
709.
There was,
however, a significant minority which spoke against the
action,
questioning
the legal basis for the action, whether it would help to disarm
Iraq, and its
potential
impact on radicalising opinion in the region. A procedural device
was used to
avoid a
vote.
710.
At a press
conference on 20 December, Mr Blair explicitly rejected
what he called
“an ‘if you
can’t remove him [Saddam Hussein], do nothing’ fallacy”. He
argued:
“I do not
accept that for instance we could only guarantee to bring him
[Saddam
Hussein]
down by a land war in Iraq … But just because we can’t get in the
cage
and strike
him down it doesn’t mean we should leave the cage untouched and
the
bars too
fragile to hold him. What we have done is put him back securely and
firmly
in the cage
…
“We have
reduced the danger Saddam poses consistent with common sense
and
a proportionate
use of force.”279
711.
In
Mr Blair’s view, military action had sent:
“… a very
clear message indeed to Saddam Hussein that we will not sit by; it
also
sends a
message to others … that the patience of the international
community
cannot be
tried indefinitely and that when it is right and when the will of
the
international
community is at stake we will act to enforce it because the first
stirrings
of a new
global reality are upon us. Those who abuse force to wage war
must
be
confronted by those willing to use force to maintain peace … We
cannot do
everything
… but what we can do reasonably we should do.”
712.
In relation to
Iraq, Mr Blair called for:
•
“… a future
strategy that is based on containment and stability for the
region.
First and
foremost, we must maintain a threat of force which Saddam
now
279
Le Monde
diplomatique,
20 December 1998, Conférence
de presse du premier ministre britannique
Anthony
Blair.
156