9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
continuing
commitment in Iraq at roughly existing levels and that therefore it
would
be
desirable to have four battlegroups deployed in Iraq and four in
Afghanistan in the
second half
of 2007 (compared with the existing six and two
respectively).
571.
The MOD
invited DOP to:
“agree that
we should continue to reduce towards four battlegroups in MND(SE)
but
that in
light of the practical challenges of handing over Basra Palace we
should be
prepared to
maintain a fifth battlegroup there until the end of Aug
07.”
572.
The case for
retaining a fifth battlegroup was twofold:
“…
practical constraints on how quickly we can hand over to the Iraqi
Army in good
order; and
considerations of tactical risk reduction coupled with a need to
take
account of
US military unease and scepticism about too rapid a run‑down. It
also
has to be
seen against our overall strategic objective for Iraq … At the
centre of US
nervousness
is a concern about a loss of situational awareness and a broader
worry
that too
rapid a withdrawal from Basra might undermine the prospects for
stability
in Iraq’s
second city. On the other hand, we should be realistic about the
impact of
temporarily
retaining a single battlegroup in Basra Palace can have on the
likelihood
or
otherwise of this happening. The actions of the Iraqi political and
security
authorities
are a far more significant factor in securing Basra’s
future.”
573.
The paper
recalled Ministers had agreed in January 2006 that Iraq was the
UK’s
top
overseas security priority but went on to say:
“… in
strictly military terms the most impact (and the best chance of
making progress
in
Afghanistan) would be achieved by devoting more resources in
Afghanistan. The
strategic
military advice is that this outweighs the tactical advantages of
retaining
Basra
Palace.”
574.
MOD officials
explained that other factors should be taken into account –
including
the UK/US
security relationship, the threat from Iran, and relations within
NATO. They
concluded
that:
“… the
overriding factor is the emerging impracticality of handing over
Basra Palace
in May. A
delay until the end of Aug 07 looks inevitable, which has the
advantage of
allowing us
to maintain better situational awareness of Basra City and assuage
US
concerns to
some extent …”
575.
The second
issue on which DOP was asked to reach a decision was a request
for
additional
troops for Afghanistan.
576.
The MOD paper
explained that:
“… at least
since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 we [the Armed Forces] have
been
operating
in excess of our assumptions, and since last spring we have
been
107