6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
874.
On 30 October,
Mr Watkins advised Mr Hoon to press for a decision to
offer
Package 3,
on the same basis as Package 2, but on the understanding that the
offer
was subject
to clarification of the Turkish position.343
“Paradoxically,
clarifying the status of Package 3 puts us in a stronger position
to
persuade
the US that this timetable is no longer realistic …”
876.
Mr Watkins
wrote that Mr Hoon might want “to counsel against any
simplistic
suggestions”
that Turkey, and the Turkish General Staff, could be persuaded
to
co‑operate.
877.
The JIC
assessed on 30 October that Turkey would support a US‑led
military
campaign
and that its opposition to UK forces could be overcome with
US
pressure.
878.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment of Turkey’s
attitude
to any
international campaign against Iraq, including Turkey’s interests
in Iraq, on
879.
The JIC judged
that Turkey did not want a war against Iraq, but it would
support
a US‑led
military campaign. Turkey appeared:
“… opposed
to UK troops. Such resistance is probably surmountable, but only
by
US
pressure. Turkey will prefer international legitimacy for the
campaign and require
guarantees
on the territorial integrity of Iraq.”
880.
The Assessment
recounted Turkish concerns about the impact of war,
including:
•
regional
instability, including if Israel was drawn in;
•
the
domestic impact of a possible outflow of Kurdish refugees;
and
•
the
economic impact of war.
881.
The JIC
attributed Turkish sensitivity to UK military involvement in the
region to its
role in the
creation of Iraq in the 1920s and stated that: “The involvement of
UK troops
in aiding
Kurds after the 1991 Gulf War aroused suspicion of UK partiality
towards
the Kurds.”
343
Minute
Watkins to Secretary of State [MOD], 30 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Meeting with Prime Minister:
31
October’.
344
JIC
Assessment, 30 October 2002, ‘Turkey: Attitude to an Iraq
Campaign’.
309