The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
291.
Early on the
morning of 20 March, US forces crossed into Iraq and seized the
port
292.
Mr Blair
continued to state that France was responsible for the
impasse.
293.
At Cabinet on
20 March, Mr Blair concluded that the Government:
“... should
lose no opportunity to propagate the reason, at every level and as
widely
as
possible, why we had arrived at a diplomatic impasse, and why it
was necessary
to take
action against Iraq. France had not been prepared to accept that
Iraq’s
failure to
comply with its obligations should lead to the use of force to
achieve
294.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair described his speech opening the debate on 18
March
as “the
most important speech I had ever made”.143
295.
Mr Blair
framed the decision for the House of Commons as a “tough” and
“stark”
choice
between “retreat” and holding firm to the course of action the
Government had
set.
Mr Blair stated that he believed “passionately” in the latter.
He deployed a wide
range of
arguments to explain the grounds for military action and to make a
persuasive
case for
the Government’s policy.144
296.
In setting out
his position, Mr Blair recognised the gravity of the debate
and the
strength of
opposition in both the country and Parliament to immediate military
action.
In his
view, the issue mattered “so much” because the outcome would not
just determine
the fate of
the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people but would:
“...
determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the
central security
threat of
the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the
relationship
between
Europe and the United States, the relations within the European
Union and
the way in
which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it
could
hardly be
more important. It will determine the pattern of international
politics for
the next
generation.”
297.
On 18 March
2003, the House of Commons was asked:
•
to
recognise that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missiles,
and its
continuing non‑compliance with Security Council resolutions,
posed
a threat
to international peace and security; and
141
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003, page 12.
142
Cabinet
Conclusions, 20 March 2003.
143
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, columns 760‑774.
40