The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“It seems
to me that our over-riding objective is the removal of Saddam not
the
insertion
of arms inspectors. It is only with a new regime that we can be
sure of an
end to CBRN
proliferation and an end to hostile intent towards his neighbours
plus
his support
for terrorism. We need to make a far greater effort to bring him
down […]
with proper
backing for internal opposition […]
“There will
be a military role, but bombing Baghdad is not the most obvious
route
to changing
regime.”
188.
Mr Powell made
a number of proposals for dealing with terrorists, including
the
need:
•
for “much
stronger domestic defence against future terrorist
attacks”;
•
to stop the
“martyrdom of UBL setting him up as … an inspiration to
another
wave of
suicide bombers”; and
•
to address
political causes.
189.
Mr Powell
wrote: “Most importantly that means persuading the Americans to
take
the MEPP
seriously.”
190.
Mr Powell
concluded that Mr Blair should engage President Bush:
“… on all
this next week, and perhaps send him another note setting out the
way
forward
before the Pentagon tries to take him off on another
tangent”.
191.
Mr Blair
replied: “I agree with this entirely and I should prepare a note
for GWB
[President
Bush] next week.”103
192.
By
late-November it was clear that agreement could not be reached on
the
UK draft
resolution.
193.
Resolution
1382, adopted on 29 November, was significantly less than
the
UK had
originally sought.
194.
Mr McKane
wrote to Sir David Manning on 23 November, advising:
“The UK
draft does not now appear to have any realistic chance of being
accepted
by the
Security Council.”104
103
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 15 November 2001,
‘The War: What
Comes
Next?’
104
Minute
McKane to Manning, 23 November 2001, ‘Iraq’.
346