9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
262.
Mr Patey
said in response that the UK welcomed the participation of Sadrists
in the
political
process and hoped to see it continue. But the UK “would not
hesitate to respond
firmly to
those who attacked British troops”. JAM1 had been detained because
the UK
had
credible evidence that he had been involved in such attacks. He was
believed to
have been
operating outside the control of Muqtada al-Sadr and JAM. His
detention
“should be
understood as action taken against a specific individual; it was
not part of any
broader
policy to work against the Sadrist movement”.
263.
Mr Patey
reported that MAS1 had responded:
“[JAM1] was
very popular in the Jaysh al-Mahdi. By detaining him, we would
destroy
any chance
of winning over the Jaysh al-Mahdi in Basra and instead cause it to
turn
wholly
against the UK forces. Rather than helping strengthen the national
forces we
said we
wanted to support, UK action would be a reason for Iranian
rejoicing.”
264.
Mr Patey
had “emphasised our concern to protect our troops” and that
JAM1 had
admitted,
whilst in custody, participating in previous attacks against UK
soldiers.
Mr Patey
said that:
“We would
look again at the information we held but [MAS1] should not be
under
any
illusion – there was no chance that [JAM1] would be released any
time soon …
it was
important not to make too much of [JAM1]’s case against the wider
backdrop.”
265.
At the end of
his report, Mr Patey commented:
“It was
striking that [MAS1] did not once refer to Muqtada al-Sadr by name
and it is
difficult
to assess the state of [MAS1]’s current relationship with al-Sadr.
Most of the
views he
expressed reflect standard Sadrist lines but it may be that his
defence of
[JAM1] was
stronger than that which al-Sadr himself might have offered. I am
still
waiting for
the Minister of Transport (Sadrist) to return to Baghdad. When he
does
I will
continue my Sadrist outreach campaign.”
266.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary confirmed on 29 September that Mr Straw had
seen
the minute
from the senior official and “agrees with your proposal to open a
channel
267.
At the end of
September the JIC tasked itself to produce an Assessment of
the
security
situation in southern Iraq.129
It judged
that:
“Despite an
increase in the number of lethal attacks on the Coalition by a few
Shia
extremist
groups, the overall security situation in southern Iraq has
remained calm in
comparison
to other parts of the country. But this position is fragile:
popular support
128
Letter
Hayes to senior government official specialising in the Middle East
(1), 29 September 2005,
‘Overture
from Muqtada al-Sadr’.
129
JIC
Assessment, 28 September 2005, ‘Iraq: the Security Situation in the
South’.
533