The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
British
were doing”. In the South, UK forces were working in Joint
Commissions to get
town
councils back in operation and people back to work. The restoration
of the southern
oilfields
was also in hand.379
668.
Gen Franks met
Adm Boyce in London on 18 April to discuss the timing of
the
announcement
of transition from Phase III to Phase IV.380
The meeting
included “a
lengthy
discussion about the allocation of regions, provinces and sectors”.
Gen Franks
and Adm
Boyce agreed that, if at all possible, Iraqi regions, military
sectors and ORHA
regions
should be coterminous.
669.
Lt Gen
Reith advised the Chiefs of Staff that many of the civilian
tasks
emerging in
the UK AOR were outside the normal competence of the
military.
670.
He stated
that there was a threat to the credibility of the UK if
no
“overarching
national direction” was given to non-military tasks.
671.
Lt Gen Reith
took stock of Phase IV planning in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff
and
MOD
officials on 22 April.381
With Phase
III “war-fighting” being replaced in Phase IV by
“the
requirement to administer Iraq in the broadest sense”, it was
becoming clear that
many issues
arising in the UK AO were “outside the normal competence of the MOD
in
general and
of PJHQ in particular”.
672.
Lt Gen Reith
advised:
“The
position in the UK AO is now sufficiently developed that direction
is required
on a whole
variety of Civil/Military affairs … As ORHA is not yet in a
position to give
such
direction, there is a significant risk that momentum will be lost,
leaving the UK
vulnerable
to charges that it has been unable to turn military success into
coherent
governance.
The implications for UK standing with the Iraqi population and
the
international
community, not to mention for the Prime Minister’s required
exemplary
performance
are potentially very serious.
“At present
the MOD is the only UK government department actively engaged
in
Iraq. It is
clear … that many of the issues now facing Iraq in general and the
UK AO
in
particular, are not military tasks and sit more comfortably with
other government
and
non-government agencies. There is currently no overarching national
direction
being
applied to ensure such organisations are actively or usefully
engaged to deal
with these
issues …
“The Iraqi
community is beginning to make it clear that it feels that the
military has
completed
its task. What they want now is long term non-military assistance
in
rebuilding
their infrastructure.”
379
Minutes, 17
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
380
Minute
PSO/CDS to PS/SofS, 18 April 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Gen Franks Call on
CDS – 18 Apr 2003’.
381
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 22 April 2003, ‘Development of UK Policy for
Op TELIC
Phase
IV’.
118