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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
198.  In a separate Assessment covering the effectiveness of efforts to engage with
Iraq’s Sunni Arab communities, the JIC judged that “The Iraqi Ba’ath Party, now based
in Damascus, has no obvious support base within Iraq.”165
199.  The JIC also assessed that “perceptions that ministries are being purged of Sunnis
under the banner of de‑Ba’athification” were “exacerbating tensions”.
200.  The Iraq Sub-Committee of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP(I))
considered a paper on 18 July entitled “Iraq: Splitting the Jihadists from the National
Opposition”.166 It had been written by the FCO and was presented by Mr Patey.
201.  The paper described jihadists as “principally foreigners, but an increasing number
of Iraqis”. Its recommendations included:
continuing to demonstrate inclusivity in the drafting of the Constitution,
committing to the timetable set out in the TAL, and being prepared to intervene
if necessary;
ensuring that the system used in the December elections was province‑based
in order to maximise Sunni Arab participation; and
pressing the ITG to relax the de‑Ba’athification rules to allow disaffected former
Army officers and officials back into the ISF and government institutions, and
ensuring that de‑Ba’athification decisions were based in a legal framework
rather than a political one.
202.  These were to be accompanied by a strong media strategy, aimed at undermining
the jihadists’ “un‑Islamic” message, and active engagement with neighbouring States.
203.  DOP(I) agreed the broad approach proposed by the FCO.167
De‑Ba’athification in the Iraqi Constitution
204.  In an update on the Iraqi Constitution sent to the FCO on 25 July, Mr Patey advised
that the first full draft contained “two unnecessary and unhelpful mentions of Ba’athism:
‘Saddamist Ba’athist’ thinking is prohibited and nominees for the National Assembly
must not have been covered by de‑Ba’athification law.”168
205.  Mr Patey considered that it would be “better and more conducive to national
reconciliation if both references were to be dropped”.
206.  A note by the IPU on 24 August said that the UK was pushing for an article on
de‑Ba’athification to be deleted “in order to increase the chances for Sunni buy‑in”.169
Shia representatives were keen to retain the section “believing it would make it harder
165 JIC Assessment, 14 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Outreach to Sunni Arabs’.
166 Paper FCO, 18 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Splitting the Jihadists from the National Opposition’.
167 Minutes, 21 July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
168 eGram 9738/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution Update, 25 July 2005’.
169 Paper IPU, 24 August 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution: Analysis’.
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