9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
161.
When the
Charge of the Knights began, the UK found itself to be
both
compromised
in the eyes of the Iraqi Government and unable to offer
significant
operational
support, as a result of the tactical decision to negotiate with
JAM1and the
absence of
situational awareness in Basra after withdrawing from the Palace
site.
162.
On 1 April,
ACM Stirrup briefed the NSID(OD) that the UK military task
would
be complete
by the end of 2008; its timetable would not be affected by the
Charge of
the Knights.
163.
ACM Stirrup’s
conclusion that there was no need to review UK drawdown
plans
was
premature in the light of both the level of uncertainty generated
by the Charge of
the Knights
and continued questions about the ability of the ISF to take the
security
lead in
Basra.
164.
From mid-2005
onwards, various senior individuals – officials, military officers
and
Ministers –
began to consider whether the UK was heading towards “strategic
failure”
in Iraq.
165.
The term
“strategic failure” was variously used to mean:
•
the
development of a widespread sectarian conflict or civil war in
Iraq;
•
“victory”
for terrorist groups;
•
collapse of
the democratic process;
•
failure to
achieve the UK’s objectives;
•
failure to
achieve a stable and secure environment in Basra;
•
the
collapse of the UK/Iraq relationship;
•
the
division of Iraq and the end of its existence as a nation
state;
•
damage to
the UK’s military and political reputation; and
•
damage to
the relationship between the US and UK.
166.
None of the
contemporary accounts that the Inquiry has considered reached
the
conclusion
that strategic failure was inevitable, although most recognised
that without
some form
of corrective action it was a serious risk.
167.
Although the
UK revisited its Iraq strategy with considerable frequency,
no
substantial
change in approach was ever implemented: UK troop numbers continued
to
reduce; the
size of the civilian deployment varied very little; the
Iraqiisation of security
and
handover of responsibility to the Iraqi Government remained key
objectives.
168.
The Iraq of
2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in
January
2003: it
fell far short of strategic success. Although the borders of Iraq
were the same
as they had
been in 2003, deep sectarian divisions threatened both stability
and unity.
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