The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
pictures of
the military operations in Fallujah and Ramadi were having on the
Sunni
community
and the Iraq population generally”.478
858.
At the same
time as dealing with Fallujah, Coalition Forces were continuing
to
address the
threat posed by Muqtada al-Sadr and the JAM.479
859.
On 8 April, in
a letter to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary, Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary
explained
that US intentions for dealing with al-Sadr and his supporters were
“becoming
clearer”
and that the US military had “ordered offensive operations against
al-Sadr
supporters
with the aim of eliminating them as a credible force”.
860.
On 8 April,
Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair on the proposed security
arrangements
after 30
June.480
He
explained that “the Coalition needs to put in place satisfactory
legal
and other
arrangements for the force when the Occupation ends”. If they did
not, “any
perceived
gap in the legal base for UK’s conduct … is likely to be exploited
by litigants”.
861.
Mr Straw
set out the difference between the US and UK positions on a
legal
basis for
continued military operations after 30 June, and the UK’s legal
concerns
about
relying on resolution 1511. He observed that a strong case might be
made that
resolution
1511 covered a continued military presence in Iraq, but that he
doubted it
would cover
“the full range of activities we have hitherto been conducting
under the law
of armed
conflict and Occupation law”.
862.
Mr Straw
suggested that in contacts with the US, the UK should stress the
need
to agree a
common approach to the forthcoming resolution (expected in May or
June)
which would
also help the UK’s position against legal challenge. He emphasised
that
when they
were nearer to a clear outcome on the resolution, it would be
necessary
to consult
the Attorney General to ensure that the UK’s minimum legal
requirements
were covered.
863.
On 9 April,
Mr Richmond reported that the Coalition had offered a
24-hour
cessation
of operations in Fallujah “to allow the entry of additional
humanitarian supplies
and to
enable representatives of the IGC to go to Fallujah to discuss
Coalition terms for
ending the
current military operation”.481
The terms
of the cessation included surrender
of the
individuals who had killed the Blackwater contractors. Had the
offer not been
made,
Mr Richmond reported that it was likely that senior Sunni
members of the GC
would have
resigned.
478
Telegram
139 IraqRep to FCO London, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Bremer’s
views’.
479
Letter
Baker to Quarrey, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Security
Situation’.
480
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 8 April 2004, ‘Iraq Security
Arrangements’.
481
Telegram
141 IraqRep to FCO London, 9 April 2004, ‘Iraq: offer of 24 Hour
Truce in Fallujah’.
346