The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

414. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that:

“... the discussion that we had in Cabinet was substantive discussion. We had it

again and again and again, and the options were very simple. The options were:

a sanctions framework that was effective; alternatively, the UN inspectors doing

the job; alternatively, you have to remove Saddam. Those were the options.”192

415. Mr Blair added:

“Nobody in the Cabinet was unaware of ... what the whole issue was about. It was

the thing running throughout the whole of the political mainstream at the time.

There were members of the Cabinet who would challenge and disagree, but most

of them agreed.”193

416. The Inquiry has seen the minutes of 26 meetings of Cabinet between 28 February

2002 and 17 March 2003 at which Iraq was mentioned and Cabinet Secretariat

notebooks. Cabinet was certainly given updates on diplomatic developments and

had opportunities to discuss the general issues. The number of occasions on which

there was a substantive discussion of the policy was very much more limited.

417. There were substantive discussions of the policy on Iraq, although not necessarily

of all the issues (as the Report sets out), in Cabinet on 7 March and 23 September 2002

and 16 January, 13 March and 17 March 2003. Those are the records which are being

published with the Report.

418. At the Cabinet meeting on 7 March 2002, Mr Blair concluded:

“... the concerns expressed in discussion were justified. It was important that the

United States did not appear to be acting unilaterally. It was critically important

to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace Process. Any military action taken against

President Saddam Hussein’s regime had to be effective. On the other hand, the

Iraqi regime was in clear breach of its obligations under several United Nations

Security Council resolutions. Its WMD programmes posed a threat to peace.

Iraq’s neighbours regarded President Saddam Hussein as a danger. The right

strategy was to engage closely with the Government of the United States in order

to be in a position to shape policy and its presentation. The international community

should proceed in a measured but determined way to decide how to respond to the

real threat represented by the Iraqi regime. No decisions to launch military action

had been taken and any action taken would be in accordance with international law.

“The Cabinet, ‘Took note, with approval.’”194

192 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 22.

193 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 228‑229.

194 Cabinet Conclusions, 7 March 2002.

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