The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
most
advanced testing facility in the world. Only 0.5 percent of all the
personnel
tested did
not have a perfect fit …”283
551.
Asked about
respirator testing, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry that he believed
only
0.5 percent
of personnel had not been tested.284
552.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry:
“The one
area of equipment which did give me concern was our ability to cope
with
any
biological or chemical threat and therefore the right kit for that,
which is basically
the suit
you wear, the protection equipment you wear, and also a gas mask.
That’s
something
which did trouble me. That was our sort of worst case scenario –
once we
went over
the line, of having chemical or biological weapons thrown at us;
and a lot
of effort
was put into making sure those who would be going in the leading
echelons
did have
the right IPE [Individual Protective Equipment], the right sort of
protective
equipment,
and everybody had their gas mask checked which at the time I went
out
was a
shortfall.”
553.
Lord Boyce
added that, by 19-20 March, he thought “we had a satisfactory
level of
kitting out
of gas masks and IPE”.285
554.
The Inquiry
asked the MOD for further information regarding the level of
stock
holdings
and provision of NBC clothing and equipment before the invasion and
the lead
times for
providing additional provisions. The MOD responded:
“Sufficient
stock of NBC suits and respirators were sent to theatre before the
start of
combat
operations to provide two per person. Further deliveries to theatre
increased
this to
four per person from 19 March 2003.”286
555.
Supplies of
ammunition were insufficient for the size and speed of the
British
deployment.
556.
The problem
was exacerbated by poor asset tracking.
557.
In analysing
the options for a possible UK contribution, Mr Hoon had been
advised
on
25 July 2002 that an armoured division could be deployed
within six months “but only
with
limited sustainment (eg 10 days ammunition)”.287
283
Statement,
6 January 2011, page 5.
284
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 42-43.
285
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 46.
286
Paper
[MOD], 21 December 2010, ‘Equipment and Capability Issues
(pre-invasion)’.
287
Minute
Bowen to PS/SofS [MOD], 25 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK
Contribution’.
90