6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
813.
US/UK
differences on the potential role of the UN in post-conflict
Iraq
became
increasingly apparent from November 2002.
814.
In early
November, the UK envisaged a six-month transitional
Coalition
military
administration handing over to a UN administration for about three
years.
US planners
foresaw a role for UN agencies (but not overall UN
leadership)
during a
US-led transitional administration, with a gradual transfer of
power to
a representative
Iraqi government.
815.
During talks
in London on 13 September with Sir David Manning, Mr
Haass
proposed
UK/US work on the political, economic, humanitarian and refugee
issues that
would
result from Saddam Hussein’s departure.393
Sir David
welcomed the proposal.
816.
Before the
talks took place, a “vigorous debate” about changes to US
planning
machinery
led to a hiatus in US post-conflict planning lasting several
weeks.394
817.
In
War and
Decision, Mr Feith
explained that, during October 2002, Secretary
Rumsfeld
reached the conclusion that one US official should be responsible
for the
political,
economic and security aspects of reconstruction.395
818.
Mr Feith
explained the idea to the NSC on 15 October. He proposed
that
CENTCOM’s
post-invasion structure should consist of a military headquarters
(the
Combined
Joint Task Force–Iraq (CJTF-I)) and a civil administration headed
by a civilian
“Iraq
co-ordinator”. Both would be under CENTCOM command. He also
proposed that
Secretary
Rumsfeld should have overall responsibility for the post-war
effort.
819.
On 18 October,
Secretary Rumsfeld told Mr Feith to set up a post-war
planning
office,
only to reverse the decision soon afterwards. Mr Feith wrote that
he only learned
much later
that this had been because President Bush was concerned that
setting up
such a unit
would undercut his international diplomacy. As a result, each of
the existing
working
groups for post-conflict issues carried on working independently.
Planning for
Phase IV of
the military campaign, taking place at CENTCOM headquarters in
Tampa,
Florida,
fell behind the other phases.
820.
Mr Feith
explained that the situation changed after Iraq’s weapons
declaration
on 7
December. On 18 December President Bush had told the NSC that war
was
“inevitable”.
Mr Feith, who had never heard the President say that before,
considered it
a
“momentous” comment. He also observed that the President’s view was
not shared by
Secretary
Powell.
393
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 13 September 2002, ‘Meetings with Richard
Haass, 13 September’.
394
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
395
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision. Harper,
2008.
251