The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
relationship”.162
Around 100
Ministers and senior officials from the Iraqi
Government
would
attend, plus Iraqi businessmen and around 200 UK businesses. Prime
Minister
Maliki
would address an evening reception at No.10.
399.
The conference
is described in more detail in Section 10.2.
400.
Mr Brown
and Prime Minister Maliki had a meeting on 30 April, during which
they
discussed
“the bilateral relationship, and closer political, economic and
investment
relations
based on the military co-operation between the two
countries”.163
401.
The discussion
also covered the need for an agreement on the legal basis for
the
ongoing UK
military presence. Prime Minister Maliki told Mr Brown that
since it was
unclear
legally whether there was a need to seek the approval of the Iraqi
Parliament,
he would
do so. He assured Mr Brown that he would do so by the end of
May.
402.
In a letter to
Mr Hutton’s Private Secretary, Mr Brown’s Assistant
Private Secretary
highlighted
that both Mr Brown and Prime Minister Maliki had paid tribute
to the work
of UK Armed
Forces in Iraq, and especially those who had lost their lives
serving their
country and
bringing stability to Iraq, in their joint press
conference.164
403.
Mr Brown’s
Assistant Private Secretary confirmed that Mr Brown “welcomed
the
completion
of the current military mission today – a month ahead of previous
plans.”
404.
On 14 May, a
Current Intelligence Group examined the prospects for
Arab-Kurd
conflict
over the coming year at the request of the FCO.165
405.
The CIG’s
Assessment recalled that the Iraqi Kurds had played a leading
role
in the
2003-2005 state-building process and had established territorial,
political and
financial
power unique to their community. They enshrined the powers and
territorial
claims of
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the Constitution,
extended their
political
and military influence beyond the KRG into disputed territories,
gained control
of Iraq’s
northern oil fields and secured 17 percent of the federal budget,
and central
funding for
their Peshmerga militia. The CIG judged that the Kurds wanted to
protect
these gains
and to extend them by bringing Kirkuk into the KRG.
406.
Although the
Kurds were allied with Arab parties within the Iraqi
Government,
disagreements
over budget allocation, Peshmerga funding, the oil industry,
disputed
internal
boundaries and constitutional review all continued to cause
tensions between
the KRG and
the central government. This had manifested itself in a challenge
to
162
eGram
15041/09 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 April 2009, ‘Iraq: Invest Iraq
Conference, London –
30 April
– 1 May’.
163
Letter
Catsaras to Hickey, 30 April 2009, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Iraqi Prime Minister, 30 April’.
164
Letter
Catsaras to Ferguson, 30 April 2009, ‘Iraq: End of Current Military
Mission’.
165
CIG
Assessment, 14 May 2009, ‘Iraq: Arab-Kurd Relations – Opportunities
& Risks’.
450