9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
174.
A note of the
discussion recorded that, on the Franks Proclamation, the US
felt
“a lot of
our [UK] concerns have been addressed”. A new version of the
Proclamation
used “verbs
that make clear to the people of Iraqi [sic] – what is legally
binding and
what is
not”.
175.
Ms Rose wrote
to Mr Llewellyn on 11 April to “be sure that we are all clear as
to
the process
of making comments [on ORHA proclamations and instructions] and
the
principles
which should underlie the changes we propose to the
US”.86
Those
principles
included
that the document:
•
should not
suggest it had legislative authority unless creating “Occupation
type
offences”
as allowed by the Geneva Convention;
•
should
refer to “dissolving” not “disestablishing” the Ba’ath
Party;
•
should not
refer to the CPA exercising legislative, judicial and executive
authority
or the
powers of government;
•
should not
deny that the Coalition forces are Occupiers; and
•
should not
cut across the Joint Commission concept.
176.
The process
for providing UK input described by Ms Rose was that
Permanent
Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ) lawyers would respond in rapid time to
documents sent
from UK
officials in theatre, but that this was “not intended to be the
last word on the
UK’s
response to the documents” and should not constrain the IPU from
offering its
own substantive
comments.
177.
When the Ad
Hoc Meeting on Iraq convened on 12 April, Ms Short
informed
attendees
that “the legal issues were being managed such that British
inhibitions would
178.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, told the meeting
that
“lawlessness
was the main problem” but:
“The
situation in Basra was being brought under control and the British
division
intended to
start joint military/[Iraqi] civil police patrols within 48
hours.”
179.
Mr Blair spoke
by telephone to President Jacques Chirac on 12
April.88
In
her
note of the
call, Ms Liz Lloyd, Adviser to Mr Blair on Foreign Policy, recorded
President
Chirac’s
view that establishing the IIA could only be the UN’s
responsibility. He had also
shared
indications from some key international institutions that a “UN
decision” was
necessary
for them to contribute.
180.
Both President
Chirac and President Bashar al-Assad of Syria raised the
looting
of
culturally significant sites, including museums and archaeological
remains, in
86
Letter Rose
to Llewellyn, 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Proclamations and
Instructions’.
87
Minutes, 12
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
88
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation
with President Chirac’.
159