The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
within the
Sunni insurgent movement with clear indications of splintering
within these
groups.
Elements are likely to break away and our judgement is that the
majority will
side with
political engagement and away from violence. We are also making
similar
inroads
with the Sadrist trend and National Ba’ath Party, amongst others
…
“The aim is
to make tangible progress by late July to underpin General
Petraeus’
‘Honest
Assessment’ to Congress in early August.”
746.
In a covering
letter, Mr Browne’s Private Secretary explained that the paper
was
being
submitted to the Defence Secretary in parallel and
commented:
“I am
convinced there is something we can do to give a reconciliation
initiative a
push. In
addition to making sure it is resourced properly and quickly we
might also
see whether
there is a potential to push a UK/US announcement of the right
sort.
A direct
reference to this specific work is too crude and potentially
damaging but I
think we
can be imaginative about say wrapping up transition, cease-fires,
weapons
programmes
and development in specific areas (Basra as a
pilot?).”
747.
At the same
time as papers on reconciliation were being considered by
Mr Blair,
IPU
submitted advice to Dr Howells proposing that the UK should work to
postpone the
referendum
on Kirkuk and other disputed territories.410
Iraq’s
Constitution required that
this should
take place by the end of 2007.
748.
IPU judged
that delay was wise because of poor preparations, which
meant
that a referendum
held before the end of the year was unlikely to be credible
and
could spark
further insecurity. The main barrier to delaying the referendum
would be
Kurdish
objections.
749.
On 22 April,
it was agreed at the Ministerial Committee on National
Security
meeting
that Prime Minister Maliki would chair a group (to include MNF‑I)
to determine
what the
Government of Iraq would be prepared to offer to opposition and
resistance
groups in
exchange for renouncing violence.411
750.
Lt Gen Lamb
reported on the same day that Gen Petraeus considered that
his
“Engagement”
team was central to success in Iraq and should be enhanced to
include
a “British
two‑star lead and UK supporting cast of around eight people for a
‘surge’ of
410
Minute
IPU [junior
official] to Howells, 20 April 2007, ‘Iraq – Referendum on Kirkuk
and Disputed
Territories’.
411
eGram
16933/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Scenesetter
for Visit by Secretary of
State for
Defence, 30 April’.
412
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 22 April 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (252) 22 Apr
07’.
140