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1.1  |  UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
743.  The best option was for Saddam Hussein to allow the inspectors to return and
Mr Butler had “proposed a roadmap to compliance that would take between three
and six months to complete” if Saddam Hussein had the will to end confrontation. But
intransigence should not be rewarded by “watered down monitoring mechanisms” or
“helping Iraq create the illusion of compliance”.
744.  Without verification that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations, however, Mr Berger argued
that force should be used if it was determined that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting
his biological, chemical or nuclear programme or the missiles to deliver his WMD. The
US strategy would be simple: “if he rebuilds it, we will come”.
745.  Mr Berger recognised that containment would be a “difficult policy to sustain in
the long run”. It was “a costly policy in economic and strategic terms”, and “even a
contained Iraq” was “harmful to the region” and condemned “the Iraqi people to a future
of unending isolation in a murderous police state”. That was why the US was “doing all
we can to strengthen the Iraqi opposition so that it can seek change inside Iraq”.
746.  Mr Berger stated that the “responsibility to mount an effective movement that
appeals to people inside Iraq and inspires them to struggle for change” lay with
the opposition leaders, but there was much that the US could and would do. It had
“reconciled the two Kurdish factions and worked with them to improve the lives of the
three million Iraqis” who lived outside Saddam Hussein’s control in the North; set up
Radio Free Iraq; and was “intensifying … contacts with the entire spectrum of opposition
groups … to help them become a more effective voice for the aspirations of the
Iraqi people”.
747.  Mr Berger concluded:
“When the time is right and the opposition is ready, we will decide what kind
of additional support it will need to overcome Saddam’s apparatus of violence
and terror. We will not overreach. But we are willing to use whatever means are
appropriate to advance our interests in Iraq, as long as the means are effective.
“We will also stand ready to help a new government in Iraq …
“We will pursue this strategy with patience and resolve and with confidence that
our goals will be met … We know from experience that when people struggling for
freedom gain the moral and material support of the American people, they usually
prevail …
“Change will come to Iraq, at a time and in a manner that we can influence but
cannot predict …”
748.  The approach set out by Mr Berger remained the strategy of President Clinton’s
Administration towards Iraq during its remaining two years in office.
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