1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
743.
The best
option was for Saddam Hussein to allow the inspectors to return
and
Mr Butler
had “proposed a roadmap to compliance that would take between
three
and six
months to complete” if Saddam Hussein had the will to end
confrontation. But
intransigence
should not be rewarded by “watered down monitoring mechanisms”
or
“helping
Iraq create the illusion of compliance”.
744.
Without
verification that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations, however,
Mr Berger argued
that force
should be used if it was determined that Saddam Hussein was
reconstituting
his
biological, chemical or nuclear programme or the missiles to
deliver his WMD. The
US strategy
would be simple: “if he rebuilds it, we will come”.
745.
Mr Berger
recognised that containment would be a “difficult policy to sustain
in
the long
run”. It was “a costly policy in economic and strategic terms”, and
“even a
contained
Iraq” was “harmful to the region” and condemned “the Iraqi people
to a future
of unending
isolation in a murderous police state”. That was why the US was
“doing all
we can to
strengthen the Iraqi opposition so that it can seek change inside
Iraq”.
746.
Mr Berger
stated that the “responsibility to mount an effective movement
that
appeals to
people inside Iraq and inspires them to struggle for change” lay
with
the
opposition leaders, but there was much that the US could and would
do. It had
“reconciled
the two Kurdish factions and worked with them to improve the lives
of the
three
million Iraqis” who lived outside Saddam Hussein’s control in the
North; set up
Radio Free
Iraq; and was “intensifying … contacts with the entire spectrum of
opposition
groups … to
help them become a more effective voice for the aspirations of
the
Iraqi people”.
747.
Mr Berger
concluded:
“When the
time is right and the opposition is ready, we will decide what
kind
of
additional support it will need to overcome Saddam’s apparatus of
violence
and terror.
We will not overreach. But we are willing to use whatever means
are
appropriate
to advance our interests in Iraq, as long as the means are
effective.
“We will
also stand ready to help a new government in Iraq …
“We will
pursue this strategy with patience and resolve and with confidence
that
our goals
will be met … We know from experience that when people struggling
for
freedom
gain the moral and material support of the American people, they
usually
prevail
…
“Change
will come to Iraq, at a time and in a manner that we can influence
but
cannot
predict …”
748.
The approach
set out by Mr Berger remained the strategy of President
Clinton’s
Administration
towards Iraq during its remaining two years in office.
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