The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

of WMD (even though many of them are ambivalent on the issue); using Saddam’s

brutal and repressive regime alone in justification would not attract much support …”

483.  Following a meeting chaired by Mr Campbell, it was agreed that the Iraq

dossier should include a history of weapons inspections and an explanation of

the sanctions regime.

484.  Reflecting the decision recorded in Mr Rycroft’s manuscript note of 25 March, that

he would “retain the lead role on the timing/form of the release” of the document on Iraq,

Mr Campbell held a meeting on 23 April.

485.  The meeting agreed that the Government:

“should aim to release …:

–– the dossier on WMD: JIC will continue their work;

–– a readable history of weapons inspections: FCO will compile;

–– an explanatory note on sanctions to get across the message that our fight is

not with the Iraqi people: FCO will prepare;

–– a note detailing the Iraqi regime’s human rights abuses: FCO will look again

at the material it has prepared for release with the WMD dossier.”212

486.  The documents should be released “as a prelude to a further push on getting the

UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq”. That could be done through a statement by

Mr Straw linked to the UN Security Council’s agreement to the Goods Review List (GRL)

(see Section 3.3). An alternative might be publication when the GRL entered into force at

the end of May.

487.  Mr Straw considered that publication of the dossier on WMD should be

separate from action in the UN on the revised Goods Review List.

488.  Mr Ben Bradshaw, FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, told the FAC on

23 April:

“We will put more evidence in the public domain and we will publish in whatever form

we think is most effective … When we feel the time is right.”213

489.  The FCO official who attended Mr Campbell’s meeting advised Mr Straw that it

would be better to separate the publication of the Iraq dossier and the discussion of the

GRL/Oil-for-Food (OFF) resolution in the UN for a number of reasons; and proposed a

number of briefing exercises instead.214

212  Minute Pruce to Campbell, 23 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.

213  Seventh Report from Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2001-2002, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War

against Terrorism, HC 384, Qs 293-294.

214  Minute FCO [junior official] to Gray, Chaplin and PS [FCO], 24 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Adoption of the Goods

Review List and Media Handling’.

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