The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

835.  Ms Miller added that, in the absence of USAID from the main inter-agency

talks, Mr Abrams had led on humanitarian issues. He had said that the inter-agency

Humanitarian Working Group was working closely with the US military, which he

anticipated would take on most of the immediate post-conflict restoration of utilities.

836.  At USAID, Ms Miller was told that OFDA was “preparing to take a major role in food

delivery, health and water and sanitation”. She reported that USAID was “extremely keen

to hold more detailed conversations in a few weeks, possibly at an overly detailed level”.

837.  Mr Fernie visited Geneva on 7 November to discuss UN humanitarian contingency

planning with UN agencies based there.401 He reported that planning was being

done discreetly and without political cover. He added that, although he had stressed

throughout that the UK was thinking about a range of scenarios, including a deterioration

of the humanitarian situation during further weapons inspections, no-one engaged on

other options: “they are all planning for conflict”.

838.  Mr Fernie listed a number of next steps:

“We need to decide if/when we could support agency preparedness (we gave no

commitment on this, citing policy and financial constraints) …

“… [W]e could consider promoting military-humanitarian co-operation on the

implications of CBW use for civilian populations.

“We should consider with Whitehall colleagues how to co-ordinate our approaches

with other donors – particularly the USA, in the light of what was learnt in

Washington this week on US views of the UN’s potential role.”

839.  UK officials drew encouragement from the adoption of resolution 1441 on

8 November.

840.  At its meeting on 8 November, the AHGI was given an update on the imminent

adoption of resolution 1441and the outcome of the Washington and Geneva visits.402

Sir David Manning was informed that, at the AHGI, departments had been:

“… encouraged, where necessary, to engage those outside government in prudent

contingency planning as long as such contact is discreet. This extends to DTI

planning on the UK role in a post-Saddam economy, particularly in the oil sector.”

841.  The adoption of resolution 1441 on 8 November and Saddam Hussein’s decision

to re-admit UN weapons inspectors are addressed in detail in Section 3.5.

842.  Mr Chaplin told the Inquiry there was “a surge of hope”.403 It seemed “there might,

after all be a route to resolving this problem through the inspection route and without

military action”. He added:

401  Minute Fernie to Miller, 8 November 2002, ‘UN Humanitarian Contingency Planning’.

402  Minute Dodd to Manning, 11 November 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.

403  Public hearing, 1 December 2009, page 26.

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