The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses conclusions in relation to the evidence set out
in
Section 12.1.
2.
This Section
does not address conclusions in relation to:
•
broader
planning and preparation for the conflict in Iraq and its
aftermath, which
are
described in Section 6.5;
•
the
decision to remove some members of the Ba’ath Party from public
office,
a process
known as “de‑Ba’athification”, which are described in Section
11.2;
•
the UK
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq, which are described
in
Section 10.4;
or
•
the
deployment of civilians to Iraq, which are described in Section
15.2.
•
Between 2003
and 2009, there was no coherent US/UK strategy for Security
Sector
Reform
(SSR).
•
The UK began
work on SSR in Iraq without a proper understanding of what it
entailed
and hugely
underestimated the magnitude of the task.
•
The UK was
unable to influence the US or engage it in a way that produced
an
Iraq‑wide
approach.
•
There was no
qualitative way for the UK to measure progress. The focus on
the
quantity of
officers trained for the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than the
quality of
officers,
was simplistic and gave a misleading sense of comfort.
•
After 2006,
the UK’s determination to withdraw from Iraq meant that aspirations
for
the Iraqi
Security Forces were lowered to what would be “good enough” for
Iraq.
It was
never clear what that meant in practice.
•
The
development of the Iraqi Army was considerably more successful than
that of the
Iraqi
Police Service. But the UK was still aware before it withdrew from
Iraq that the
Iraqi Army
had not been sufficiently tested. The UK was not confident that the
Iraqi
Army could
maintain security without support.
414