3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
of Sunni in
the INC and argued for replacing Saddam Hussein with a
functioning
democracy
not another military officer.
397.
Sir
Christopher and Mr Wolfowitz also discussed developments in
Afghanistan,
including
the planned deployment of 45 Commando Group and Sir Christopher’s
view
that:
“… the
greatest danger in Afghanistan was a slipping back to the
conditions which
had allowed
Al Qaida to prosper in the first place; that the greatest
safeguard
against
this was a continuing visible presence of the US military … for
some time to
come.
Wolfowitz displayed the DoD’s customary distaste for an ISAF-type
expansion
to other
Afghan cities. He thought there was a case for something akin to
OSCE
monitors in
certain regions.”
398.
Sir David
thought the report sufficiently interesting to show to Mr
Blair.141
399.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry that Sir David Manning had given
him a new
set of
instructions during his visit to Washington in March
2002.142
400.
Sir
Christopher described the new message for the Americans
as:
“Look, if
you want to do regime change, and if this is going to require
military action,
you … can
do it on your own … but if … you want your friends and partners to
join
you, far
better that you should do it inside an alliance, preferably taking
the UN
route.
“That … was
the single most important message I delivered to the US
Administration
at that
time.”
401.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry:
“… I had to
come up with a set of arguments, which … he [Wolfowitz] might
find
appealing
enough not to become a serious obstacle to a policy that would
involve
402.
Later Sir
Christopher added:
“… I think
the attitude of Downing Street … was … it was a fact that there was
…
the Iraq
Liberation Act. It was a fact that 9/11 had happened and it was a
complete
waste of
time, therefore … if we were going to be able to work with the
Americans,
to … say,
‘We can’t support it [regime change]’ … the attempt was made to
square
the circle
… was actually … so to contextualise it, that regime change, if and
when
141
Manuscript
note Manning to Prime Minister on Letter Meyer to Manning, 18 March
2002, ‘Iraq and
Afghanistan:
Conversation with Wolfowitz’.
142
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, pages 38-39.
143
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, page 39.
457