6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

1247. There was also a possibility of deploying additional high readiness forces and the

US had asked for additional logistics support.

1248. If a decision was taken by 15 January, UK combat forces could be in the theatre

by late March.

1249. The disadvantages of that option would be that the UK would “potentially, not hold

its own area of responsibility or operate at the divisional level of command”, and 16 Air

Assault Brigade would need to be extracted from Op FRESCO duties.

1250. On 18 December, Lt Gen Reith informed the Chiefs of Staff that:

• The US had identified 15 February as the optimum date for combat operations

and was seeking to bring together the start of the air and ground campaigns.

• The US campaign plan had: “changed to an information operation supported by

manoeuvre rather than vice versa. The centre of gravity was now the oilfields

rather than Baghdad. Securing the oilfields would provide a means of funding

Phase IV operations and the rebuilding of the infrastructure. It would also help

avert an environmental disaster …”480

1251. In discussion of the “Land Options” paper, Gen Walker took the view that a UK

division operating alone in the North “represented the most sensible military solution,

but accepted that Op FRESCO commitments precluded it from being taken in its present

form”; it was likely to be available only for Phase IV operations.

1252. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed Lt Gen Reith’s request to take forward exploratory

work on options for the South.

1253. The Chiefs of Staff also discussed a paper by Maj Gen Fry on the provision of a

UK stabilisation force in the event of early military or regime collapse leading to a “loss

of control”.481

1254. Maj Gen Fry defined “early collapse” as the collapse of the Iraqi regime less than

60 days after the political decision to take military action (“P Day”), and “loss of control”

as “the period between the collapse of the Iraqi regime and the establishment of an

effective alternative providing law and order and security”.

1255. The paper stated:

“Rapid intervention by the Coalition may be required to stabilise the situation,

including support to an interim government. Current Package 3 deployment

timelines would limit the arrival of sufficient and appropriate UK military capability in

time. Consequently there is a need to develop a contingency plan that would enable

480 Minutes, 18 December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

481 Paper DCJO(Ops) [MOD], 16 December 2002, ‘Provision of a UK Stabilisation Force’.

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