9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
271.
SIS3 told the
Inquiry that Muqtada al-Sadr was “following events, rather
than
driving
events from his bolthole in Iran”.125
272.
Maj Gen Binns
reported on 30 August that UK forces had handed over the
PJCC
four days
previously, ahead of schedule and without incident.126
He was
disappointed
by Gen
Mohan’s assessment that the PPF was unable to undertake security
at
Basra Palace
yet. He judged this to be “brinksmanship with Baghdad”, that
was
being used
to push for the resources needed for other security aspirations,
rather
than for
Basra Palace.
273.
Commenting
from Baghdad, Major General Gerald Berragan, Deputy
Commanding
General
(Operations) Multi-National Corps – Iraq, reported concerns that
some of the
additional
resources that were being deployed to Basra at Gen Mohan’s request
were
not yet
fully trained or equipped.127
274.
One of the
(all Shia) National Police units had a reputation in Baghdad “for
its
seemingly
active role in ethnic cleansing of Sunni districts” and for
“turning a blind eye –
or worse –
to JAM activities”. He cautioned that “reinforcements from Baghdad
may
bring other
complications to the Basra security scene, and these units will
clearly require
some
serious support and mentoring if they are to be
successful”.
275.
Maj Gen Binns,
Gen Mohan and Lt Gen Odierno agreed on 30 August that
the
conditions
were set for handover of Basra Palace on the night of 2/3
September.128
276.
On the evening
of 31 August, Mr Browne told Mr Brown that the
handover
would take
place on 3 September.129
He added
that transition to PIC looked “likely”
for November.
277.
In a letter to
Mr Brown of the same date, Mr Browne wrote:
“…
following the handover of Basra Palace and our other Basra City
bases, we
will de
facto be at PIC with the Iraqi Security Forces leading on security
in Basra
City. While
our move out of Basra Palace has never been linked to PIC, it was
not
envisaged
that the gap between the two events would be as large as it is now
likely
to be. Set
against the background of the UK technically retaining
responsibility for
security in
the province until PIC, this will entail a period of greater
operational risk
and,
although UK commanders judge this to be acceptable, we should aim
to keep
this gap as
short as possible.”130
125
Private
hearing, 2010, pages 62-63.
126
Minute
Binns to CJO, 30 August 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update – 30 August 2007’.
127
Minute
Berragan to CJO, 30 August 2007, ‘MNC-I Update – 30 Aug
07’.
128
Letter
Browne to Brown, 31 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Handover of Basrah Palace
and Provincial Iraqi Control
in
Basra’.
129
Minute
Robbins to McDonald, 31 August 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Defence Secretary’.
130
Letter
Browne to Brown, 31 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Handover of Basrah Palace
and Provincial Iraqi
Control in
Basra’. The papers indicate that Mr Brown did not see this
letter as it was superseded by his
conversation
with Mr Browne.
233