6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
similarities
to the assumptions in the 13 June SPG paper, reflected the views of
the
members of
the Committee.
536.
The judgements
were incorporated in a revised SPG paper produced on
4 September.
537.
The assessment
of Saddam Hussein’s diplomatic options is addressed in
Section 3.4.
538.
From late
July it was clear that the possible requirement to provide
cover
in the
event of a nationwide firefighters’ strike (Op FRESCO) would limit
the UK’s
ability to
deploy ground forces.
539.
The MOD
continued, however, to promote the advantages of the
northern
option to
both UK Ministers and US military planners.
540.
In August
UK military planning actively focused on identifying the
maximum
contribution
which the UK might be able to offer to the US.
541.
The MOD
advised No.10 on 28 August that if Op FRESCO was
implemented
in full,
the UK would be able to provide only a brigade for land operations;
and
that the US
should be informed.
542.
During the
period leading up to the invasion of Iraq a dispute over pay
and
conditions
with the Fire Brigades Union led to a requirement for an MOD
contingency
plan, Op
FRESCO, to provide a replacement fire‑fighting capability to which
some
19,000
Service Personnel were assigned.221
543.
Military
advice about the UK’s ability to generate ground forces changed
radically
between the
end of July and the end of August. The evidence clearly
demonstrates
the focus
on identifying the “maximum effort” and giving the UK a combat role
in
ground operations.
544.
Mr Hoon
was sceptical about the wisdom of that approach and sought to
ensure
that No.10
was given a more balanced perspective.
545.
No.10 was
warned on 26 July about the potential impact of a firefighters’
strike on
the UK’s
ability to deploy land forces for operations in
Iraq.222
546.
On 22 August,
in the context of a predicted discussion between the US and
Turkey
on a
possible northern option, ACM Bagnall commented to Air Vice Marshal
Clive
Loader,
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS(Ops)), that
a MOD
meeting
held on 21 August had concluded:
221
Report
MOD, Operations
in Iraq: First Reflections, July
2003.
222
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
257