9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
602.
On 17
November, The
Guardian reported a
press conference by Maj Gen Binns in
Baghdad in
which he:
“…
confirmed … that UK officials have been holding talks with
supporters of the
Shia cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in the hope they would be drawn into
the
603.
Maj Gen Binns
was reported to have said that not everyone in the Mahdi
Army
supported
the talks, and that its main rival, the Badr brigade, was too weak
to mount a
challenge.
The
Guardian reported
that:
“British
officials last night were keen to emphasise that the talks with the
militia
were being
held with the full support and, at times, participation of Major
General
Abdul Jalil
Khalaff and General Mohan … The talks have been accompanied by
the
release, by
British forces, of Mahdi Army fighters detained in connection with
attacks
on British
troops.”
604.
On 18
November, Lt Gen Rollo reported that if Governor Waili remained
in
post, then
the UK might be faced with “a difficult decision on whether to
accept an
unsatisfactory
solution on 17 December or to hold out for one which will really
set the
conditions
for next year”.282
The Iraqi
Government’s solution was “for the Prime Minister
to accept
the security file and delegate it to General Mohan”. The coalition
view was
that this
was “bad in law, bad politically at home, and bad in practice in
Basra, where we
want a
solid triumvirate, including the Governor, alongside the BOC
Commander and
the Chief
of Police.”
605.
Mr Prentice
reported on 19 November that Dr Rubaie said that he had submitted
a
“favourable”
memo to Prime Minister Maliki on UK recommendations for the
handling of
Basra PIC,
but had yet to receive a response.283
606.
On 19
November, a junior official from the FCO Iraq Group provided advice
to
Dr Kim
Howells, FCO Minister of State, and Mr Miliband on “Broadening
the basis
of
negotiations with [JAM1]” which reflected discussion at
Mr Lyall Grant’s meeting
607.
The issue
discussed in the submission was described as “To maintain a
dialogue
with …
[JAM1] once all detainees have been released, to ensure the recent
political
and
security gains in Basra are expanded.” The preferred option was
that Mr Miliband
agreed to
broaden the scope of negotiations with JAM1 to include “the
integration
of the Sadr-ists
into Basra’s formal political process, including Sadrist
participation in
provincial elections”.
281
The
Guardian, 17
November 2007, British
officials hold talks with Mahdi army.
282
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 18 November 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (277) 18
Nov 07’.
283
eGram
47120/07, Baghdad to FCO London, 19 November 2007, ‘Iraq; Political
Round-Up’.
284
Minute FCO
Iraq Group [junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 19
November 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Broadening the basis of negotiations with [JAM1]’.
295