13.1 |
Resources
328.
On 17 March,
at Ms Short’s request, DFID officials prepared a paper
on
shortcomings
in humanitarian preparations and steps needed to address
them.194
329.
Officials
identified seven problems:
“•
UN funding
needs insufficiently met. Preparedness incomplete …
•
Red Cross
Movement preparing but requires substantial funding support
…
•
NGOs
beginning to establish presence but not fully prepared
…
•
US
preparedness for response lacks local experience and based on
optimistic
assumptions
…
•
How to
maintain the Oil‑for‑Food (OFF) programme …
•
How to
support humanitarian agencies [to] gain early access to Iraq
…
•
How
Coalition Forces can provide effective humanitarian response
…”
330.
The proposed
solution for the first three problems was provision of
“immediate
additional
funds to DFID”.
331.
Ms Short
sent the paper to Mr Blair on 17 March with the
comment:
“This summarises
what needs to be done to improve humanitarian
preparedness.
Perhaps we
could really focus on this next week.”195
332.
The military
role in providing humanitarian assistance was summarised in a
joint
minute from
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon to Mr Blair on 19
March.196
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon
advised:
“The
military task will be to facilitate a secure environment … to
enable immediate
humanitarian
relief to be conducted. To help UK forces win hearts and
minds,
HMT [the
Treasury] have allocated them £30m for humanitarian purposes in the
first
month as
well as £10m for quick win projects. (Clare [Short] has allocated
£20m for
UN
agencies’ preparations and earmarked another £60m from DFID’s
Contingency
Reserve for
humanitarian operations. But this is a drop in the ocean; in the
worse
case, if
the Oil‑for‑Food programme ground to a halt, Iraq could need as
much as
a billion
dollars a month for humanitarian aid).”
333.
The Coalition
began military action against Iraq on the night of 19/20
March.
194
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID],
17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Humanitarian
Assistance’ attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq: What is lacking in
terms of being prepared
for an
effective humanitarian response and what would it take to address
that?’
195
Manuscript
comment Short on Minute DFID [junior official] to Private
Secretary/Secretary of State
DFID], 17
March 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Assistance’.
196
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post‑Conflict
Iraq’.
497