3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
UNMOVIC/IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] of a concealed
weapons
programme,
or of a cache of WMD material not declared …”
•
“Efforts to
constrain UNMOVIC/IAEA’s operations in significant ways contrary
to
the
provisions of SCR 1441 (2002) … and other relevant resolutions.
Systematic
efforts to
deter, obstruct or intimidate the interview process would need to
be
particularly
carefully watched.”
•
“Systematic
Iraqi harassment of inspectors … which jeopardised their
ability
to fulfil
their duties …”
•
Failure to
accept resolution 1441.
•
“A pattern
of relatively minor Iraqi obstructions of
UNMOVIC/IAEA.”
71.
On the last
point, the paper added:
“We would
not take the view that a short (hours) delay in giving UNMOVIC
access
to a site
would constitute a material breach unless there was clear evidence
that the
Iraqis used
such a delay to smuggle information out of a site or to coach
potential
witnesses.
But repeated incidents of such obstruction, even without evidence
of
accompanying
Iraqi deception, would cumulatively indicate that the Iraqis were
not
fully
co‑operating, and thus cast doubt upon whether UNMOVIC would ever
be able
to
implement its mandate properly.”
72.
The FCO stated
that a similar US list would “probably … be even
tougher”.
“Given the
opportunity” in the resolution for the US to make its own report to
the Council,
the UK
needed “to be clear in our own minds where the dividing lines”
were. The paper
recommended
that the UK would need to work out “where to draw our red lines”
with
the US; and
that “in the interests of maintaining maximum Council support for
use of
force, we
should try to persuade the Americans to focus on the more serious
possible
violations,
or to establish a pattern of minor obstruction”.
73.
The paper did
not address the issue of whether a Council decision would
be
needed “to
determine that Iraq’s actions justify the serious consequences
referred to
in OP13
of 1441”. That would be “a matter on which we will need the
Attorney’s views”.
74.
An undated,
unsigned document, headed “Background on material breach”
and
received in
No.10 around 20 November, raised the need to address three,
primarily
legal,
issues:
•
the need to
clarify whether OP4 “must be construed” in the light of the
Vienna
Convention
and past practice as that suggested “a much higher bar
than
the US”;
•
the need to
seek Lord Goldsmith’s advice “on how OPs 1 and 2 (and 13)
and
the
declaration of material breach they contain affect the legal
situation of Iraq
and our
authority to use force”; and specifically whether it could be
argued that
“1441 itself
(especially OPs 1, 2 and 13 taken together) contains a
conditional
17