6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
249.
In subsequent
evidence to the Inquiry in February 2010, Sir Kevin added that
the
shift to
the South, which “took place progressively” from mid-December to
mid-January
2003, “was
a very significant shift” and he had “felt that it was important to
reappraise,
to pause,
to take stock as to what was going on”.81
250.
Sir Kevin told
the Inquiry that he had “certainly” written to Mr Hoon; and that
he
thought he
had written “a personal note” which he had been unable to find
before the
hearing.
That had expressed his:
“… concerns
that we were … being led into a possible military action, where
we
might not
actually have secured our objectives; in other words, we wouldn’t
have
disarmed
Saddam by the diplomatic route. We might not get a second
resolution.
We hadn’t
got post-conflict planning as well pinned down with the United
States
as any of
us wanted at that stage.”82
251.
Asked if he
had had a response, Sir Kevin stated that he had “discussed
this”
with Mr
Hoon and he thought they “were very much of one mind that this did
need to
be thought
through very carefully”.83
252.
Sir Kevin told
the Inquiry that Mr Hoon had asked him to produce a “note on
the
transatlantic
relationship”:
“One of the
issues at that stage was that we had gone so far, by the end
of
December,
with the United States in planning – not just because we wanted
to
be with the
United States, but because I knew the Government believed in
what
it was
doing – that to have gone back at that point and decided not to
proceed in
circumstances
where we hadn’t disarmed Saddam … would have been
particularly
difficult
for our relationship with the United States.”84
253.
Asked whether
at that stage there was no going back and no room for
reassessment,
Sir Kevin replied:
“There was
never an unconditional commitment at all. I think that when one
begins
to engage
in military planning, one takes a risk that, if one doesn’t see it
through
in a way
that was designed to achieve the effect of disarming Saddam
Hussein
diplomatically,
or the use of force …”85
254.
Sir Kevin
added that, if the UK had backed down “without any of those
conditions
being met”,
that would have carried “its own damage”.
81
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 24.
82
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 24-25.
83
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 25.
84
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 25-26.
85
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 26.
421